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Summary Table 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure 1.0 -2.4 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure -6.5 -4.3 -3.0 -1.5 -1.5 
Investment -22.6 -12.6 -3.9 3.1 3.6 
Exports 6.2 5.1 2.7 3.9 4.9 
Imports 3.6 -0.3 0.0 4.3 4.4 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -0.8 1.4 1.3 1.3 2.3 
Gross National Product (GNP) 0.9 -2.5 3.1 -2.0 1.4 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
    
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) -1.0 2.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings -1.5 0.1 1.1 1.2 1.5 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Labour Market 
    
 
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,882 1,849 1,832 1,832 1,839 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 303 317 322 314 307 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 13.9 14.6 14.9 14.6 14.3 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Public Finance 
    
 
Exchequer Balance (€bn) -18.7 -24.9 -14.9 -15.2 -12.4 
General Government Balance (€bn) -48.4 -20.2 -12.9 -12.6 -9.1 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -30.9 -12.7 -7.9 -7.5 -5.1 
General Government Balance excluding bank costs  
(% of GDP) -10.8 -9.0 -7.9 -7.5 
 
-5.1 
General Government Debt, % of GDP 92 106 117 121 118 
 
    
 
  
    
 
External Trade 
    
 
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) 1.8 1.8 7.8 4.3 6.9 
Current Account (% of GNP) 1.4 1.4 5.9 3.2 5.0 
 
Note: Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
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Summary 
Since the last Commentary, expectations for global economic activity have been 
scaled back once more. The outcome for 2012 is likely to be slightly more muted 
than had been expected, while any improvement in 2013 also looks set to be 
more subdued than previously thought. There are some signs that there could be 
a slight pick-up in growth in 2014. A resumption of trend growth in the eurozone 
would lead to an upward revision to Irish export growth forecasts, higher levels of 
GNP and GDP, an improvement in the public finances and a more speedy 
resolution of the public finances crisis.   
 
GDP is estimated to have increased by 1.3 per cent in 2012. Export growth in 2012 
was driven by a large expansion in services, while exports of goods declined. The 
domestic economy remained weak with contractions in household consumption, 
investment and government consumption. Employment levels are likely to have 
continued to decline and, as a result, the unemployment rate is estimated to have 
averaged 14.9 per cent, an increase on the 2011 average of 14.6 per cent. 
 
This Commentary presents our first forecast for 2014. We forecast that GDP will 
grow by 1.3 per cent this year and by 2.3 per cent in 2014. In 2013 and 2014 we 
expect exports of goods to increase and exports of services to continue to grow 
rapidly. Domestic demand, on the other hand, will further contract as high 
unemployment, fiscal adjustment and deleveraging persist. A large balance of 
payments surplus in 2012 is expected to remain over the forecast horizon.  
 
The unemployment rate is forecast to decline from 14.9 per cent in 2012 to 14.6 
per cent in 2013 and 14.3 per cent in 2014, mainly due to ongoing net emigration. 
We expect continued stabilisation in employment and the labour market over the 
two years.  
 
Our view is that the fiscal targets will be met in 2013 and 2014, though meeting 
the expenditure targets in 2013 will be challenging. If the Croke Park Extension 
discussions are successful, the carryover into 2014 could lead to the realisation of 
the 2014 targets. 
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National Accounts 2012 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2011 2012 % Change in 2012 
 
€bn €bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 81.3 81.6 0.4 1.4 -1.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.4 25.0 -1.6 1.5 -3.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 16.1 15.6 -3.3 0.6 -3.9 
Exports of Goods and Services 166.8 176.9 6.1 3.3 2.7 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.2 -0.1    
Final Demand 289.8 299.0 3.2 2.4 0.7 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 131.9 136.8 3.7 3.7 0.0 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.0 1.0    
GDP at Market Prices 159.0 163.2 2.7 1.3 1.3 
Net Factor Payments (F) -32.0 -31.1    
GNP at Market Prices 127.0 132.1 4.0 0.9 3.1 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 
€bn €bn €bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.0 -0.3 -8.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 67.8 68.0 0.3 0.4 
Other 58.1 61.7 3.7 6.3 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.6 -0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.0 -1.0 
  Net Domestic Product 127.4 131.1 3.7 2.9
Net Factor Payments -32.0 -31.1 0.8 -2.7 
National Income 95.5 100.0 4.6 4.8 
Depreciation 15.8 15.5 -0.3 -2.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 111.3 115.5 4.2 3.8 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.8 16.6 0.8 5.4 
GNP at Market Prices 127.0 132.1 5.1 4.0 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 
€bn €bn €bn 
X – M 34.9 40.1 5.2 
F -32.0 -31.1 0.8 
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.2 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 1.8 7.8 6.0 
as % of GNP 1.4 5.9 4.6 
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National Accounts 2013 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2012 2013 % Change in 2013 
 
€bn €bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 81.6 82.5 1.1 1.6 -0.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.0 25.0 0.0 1.5 -1.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 15.6 16.1 3.5 0.4 3.1 
Exports of Goods and Services 176.9 188.0 6.2 2.3 3.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks -0.1 1.0    
Final Demand 299.0 312.6 4.6 1.9 2.6 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 136.8 145.6 6.4 2.0 4.3 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.0 1.0    
GDP at Market Prices 163.2 168.1 3.0 1.6 1.3 
Net Factor Payments (F) -31.1 -36.9    
GNP at Market Prices 132.1 131.1 -0.7 1.3 -2.0 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€bn €bn €bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.2 0.2 7.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 68.0 68.9 0.9 1.3 
Other 61.7 64.9 3.1 5.1 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.6 -0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.0 -1.0 
  Net Domestic Product 131.1 135.4 4.3 3.2
Net Factor Payments -31.1 -36.9 -5.8 -18.6 
National Income 100.0 98.5 -1.5 -1.5 
Depreciation 15.5 15.5 0.0 0.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 115.5 114.0 -1.5 -1.3 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.6 17.2 0.6 3.4 
GNP at Market Prices 132.1 131.1 -1.0 -0.7 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€bn €bn €bn 
X – M 40.1 42.4 2.3 
F -31.1 -36.9 -5.8 
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.2 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 7.8 4.3 -3.5 
as % of GNP 5.9 3.3 -2.7 
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National Accounts 2014 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2013 2014 % Change in 2014 
 
€bn €bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 82.5 83.4 1.1 1.6 -0.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.0 25.0 0.0 1.5 -1.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 16.1 16.8 3.9 0.3 3.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 188.0 203.6 8.3 3.2 4.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.0 2.0    
Final Demand 312.6 330.8 5.8 2.5 3.2 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 145.6 155.1 6.6 2.1 4.4 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.0 1.1    
GDP at Market Prices 168.1 176.7 5.2 2.8 2.3 
Net Factor Payments (F) -36.9 -40.4    
GNP at Market Prices 131.1 136.4 4.0 2.6 1.4 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€bn €bn €bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.5 0.3 8.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 68.9 70.5 1.6 2.3 
Other 64.9 70.1 5.2 8.0 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.6 -0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.0 -1.1 
  Net Domestic Product 135.4 142.3 7.0 5.1
Net Factor Payments -36.9 -40.4 -3.4 9.3 
National Income 98.5 102.0 3.5 3.6 
Depreciation 15.5 16.0 0.5 3.2 
GNP at Factor Cost 114.0 118.0 4.0 3.5 
Taxes less Subsidies 17.2 18.4 1.2 7.2 
GNP at Market Prices 131.1 136.4 5.2 4.0 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€bn €bn €bn 
X – M 42.4 48.4 6.1 
F -36.9 -40.4 -3.4 
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.2 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 4.3 6.9 2.6 
as % of GNP 3.3 5.0 1.9 
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1 
 
The International Economy 
 
Since the last Commentary, expectations for global economic activity have been 
scaled back once more. The outcome for 2012 is likely to be slightly more muted 
than had been forecast, while any improvement in 2013 also looks set to be more 
subdued than previously thought, although there could be a slight pick-up in 
growth in 2014. Major issues concerning Ireland’s main trading partners relate to 
the pace at which decisions are being taken to alleviate policy uncertainty, the 
speed at which outstanding balance sheet problems are being resolved and the 
appropriateness of large-scale, parallel efforts to tighten fiscal policy. 
 
US figures for the third quarter of 2012 suggested that Ireland’s second largest 
goods export market1 expanded at an annual rate of 3.1 per cent. The expansion 
was primarily driven by rising consumer and government expenditure and a 
gradually recovering residential property market. Weaknesses remained evident 
in other major components of growth, however, with business fixed investment 
and exports both softening.  
 
The debate surrounding the expiration of various fiscal measures and the very 
short-term solution agreed in early January continues to be a source of concern in 
the US and has already prompted some scale-back in growth estimates for this 
year. Fiscal tightening equivalent to as much as 4.1 per cent of GDP would have 
occurred in 2013 if political gridlock had not been avoided. In the event there 
were some modest changes in taxes with the removal or reduction of allowances 
and credits and a higher tax rate (from 35 per cent to 39.6 per cent) on incomes 
over $400,000. Expenditure was virtually untouched, but the authorities must 
return to the issue by end February. The extent to which various welfare and 
other expenditure measures are withdrawn or extended over future years will 
determine the size of this impact but the uncertainty caused by a delay in 
resolving these issues has constrained the recovery in private investment as well 
as consumer spending and will continue to do so. On a more positive note, the 
Federal Reserve has announced that the federal funds rate will remain in the 
range of 0-0.25 per cent as long as unemployment remains above 6.5 per cent, in 
the context of inflation remaining only marginally above the target rate. The 
Federal Reserve also announced that it will continue to purchase agency 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
1  Central Statistics Office data shows goods exports to the US were valued at €16.8 billion for the first 11 months of 
2012. 
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mortgage-backed securities at the rate of $40 billion per month, and will also 
purchase Treasury securities to keep long-term interest rates low. If the fiscal 
adjustment is muted there could be a modest pick-up in 2013 and 2014 from 
moderate GDP growth of around 2 per cent in 2012. 
 
The German and French economies contracted during the fourth quarter of 2012, 
and economic activity across the eurozone remains stagnant. Much of this relates 
to the parallel efforts to tighten public finances. Improved coordination of 
eurozone fiscal policy would be more desirable at present as larger fiscal 
multipliers stemming from concurrent fiscal contractions appear to be inducing 
stronger negative impacts on output than would be the case where fiscal policies 
were more varied.2 Many economies are now attempting an economic 
restructuring, whereby domestic demand is repressed, competitiveness 
recovered and exports expanded. The logic of this approach, when practised in 
unison, is highly questionable. Specifically, it is not clear whether demand will be 
vigorous enough in traditional eurozone markets to sustain multiple export-led 
recoveries if domestic demand is widely suppressed. Unlike the situation in a 
single country there are no internal transfers from well performing areas to 
poorly performing areas in the eurozone. Following an estimated contraction in 
2012 of 0.5 per cent, eurozone GDP is forecast to decline by 0.1 per cent in 2013, 
with prospects for improvement in the second half of the year remaining fragile, 
before returning to growth of 1.1 per cent in 2014. This poor growth in Europe, in 
turn, is undermining the capacity of the Irish economy to engineer near-term 
growth.  
 
Medium-term prospects for the UK economy also remain subdued, with a number 
of inhibiting factors restraining the emergence of a meaningful recovery. An 
appreciation in the nominal exchange rate (4 per cent for the year-to-date on a 
trade-weighted basis) is also taking its toll on export competitiveness at a time 
when external demand in traditional export markets, most notably the eurozone, 
is already highly depressed. Another over-riding factor affecting the pace of the 
recovery is the on-going process of balance sheet repair in the private sector 
following the financial crisis. UK gross household debt is currently higher than in 
any other G7 economy while savings rates are comparatively low. These factors 
combined with the simultaneous pursuit of pronounced fiscal tightening are 
constraining economic activity.3 If confronted with further evidence of weak 
growth, the UK government may well decide to ease the pace of fiscal 
consolidation in the near future, though this is by no means clear at present. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
2  Country simulations estimate that for an economy attempting a fiscal consolidation while the rest of the world is also 
engaged in consolidation and interest rates are near zero, the negative impact on output is more than double what it 
would be in a scenario where the rest of the world was not engaged in such consolidation. See IMF, “Will it Hurt? 
Macroeconomic effects of Fiscal Consolidations,” Chapter 3 of World Economic Outlook, October 2010. 
3  The IMF forecast a general government deficit for the UK in 2012/2013 of 8 per cent.  
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Another area that has concerned policymakers is the reduced flow of credit to 
businesses. The availability of cheaper funding through the Bank of England’s 
Funding for Lending Scheme and the ECB announcement of outright monetary 
transactions appear to have had some positive impact in terms of reducing banks’ 
funding costs.4 The pass-through, in terms of easing credit conditions facing 
businesses as well as households, will take some time, but already signs of a 
significant increase in secured credit availability have emerged in the Bank’s Credit 
Conditions Survey. In light of the various headwinds confronting the UK economy, 
we expect that GDP will have contracted in 2012, with only a modest expansion 
likely in 2013.  
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% change, year-on-year)
 
        Eurozone         United States       United Kingdom 
  
 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, Eurostat, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
In spite of poor economic performance in all Ireland’s main markets, world trade 
is expected to grow more rapidly in 2013 and 2014 than in 2012.  At a country 
level this reflects a return to very rapid growth in trade, both exports and imports, 
in China, India and Brazil. The recovery in these countries’ exports reflects an 
improvement in domestic demand in the more developed economies and the 
continued competitiveness of their products.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
4 Outright Monetary Transactions entail the purchase by the European Central Bank (ECB) of sovereign bonds on the 
primary or secondary markets and are focused on securities with a maturity of one to three years. This funding is to 
be provided so long as strict conditions attached to a macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary 
programme are met. The Bank of England’s £80 billion Funding for Lending Scheme launched in July 2012 is intended 
to incentivise more household and business lending in the UK by providing direct central bank loans to banks or 
building societies below market interest rates. If these institutions subsequently decrease such lending, then the 
associated cost of obtaining this funding from the Bank of England is subject to an increase. 
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The critical factor affecting the world economy is the failure of the eurozone to 
pull out of recession. This in turn has dampened the recovery in the US and the 
UK, both markets that are very important for Ireland. The eurozone economy is 
bedevilled by the failure to resolve the debt crisis in a decisive manner.  Our view 
of the prospects for the Irish economy in 2013 and 2014 is heavily influenced by 
the continued failure to deal with the international crisis. A fundamental shift in 
fiscal policy at the eurozone level is needed to return the monetary union to 
stable growth. If measures were adopted along the lines we have suggested in 
previous Commentaries, Ireland’s economic prospects would improve 
significantly. A resumption of trend growth in the eurozone would lead to an 
upward revision to Irish export growth forecasts, higher levels of GNP and GDP, an 
improvement in the public finances and a more speedy resolution of the public 
finances crisis.   
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2 
 
Exports of Goods and Services 
 
Merchandise exports from Ireland have reflected the poor performance of the 
developed world's economies over the past two years. These exports peaked in 
the second quarter of 2011 and were on a downward trend to the third quarter of 
2012 when there was a very modest recovery.5 Despite the recovery, it seems 
that the volume of merchandise exports may have fallen by as much as 2.5 per 
cent in 2012. This is very much weaker than we had previously expected. Exports 
from indigenous companies were weak with food and drink exports particularly 
poor. The hope of a continued shift to exports as domestic demand was squeezed 
did not take place. Partly this reflected the poor international situation, but 
domestic supply conditions may also have been a factor. For example, milk output 
fell in 2012 by 2.5 per cent and cattle slaughterings were down by over 10 per 
cent. Production of beverages fell by 8 per cent, and while domestic demand was 
weak here exports did not take up the slack. The weakness in exports was 
somewhat surprising in that there have been substantial reductions in unit wage 
costs in recent years and the weakness of the euro had provided a short-term 
exchange rate gain. It remains very difficult to increase export sales in the face of 
a downturn in external demand. One consequence of the euro weakness was an 
increase in the deflator for exports of goods, now estimated to have increased by 
5 per cent in 2012. 
 
By contrast, exports of services in 2012 grew very rapidly. We estimate the 
growth at 8-9 per cent. This growth was due primarily to the expansion of recently 
established overseas firms in the communications and IT sectors. Within the 
services sector tourism receipts were weak. The recovery in the number of 
tourists from North America and Europe continued, but there was a decline in the 
number coming from Britain. Overall exports of goods and services rose by 2.7 per 
cent in volume in 2012.   
 
Turning now to this year and next our forecasts are heavily influenced by the 
continuing weakness in the world economy. Trade in a downturn tends to weaken 
more than domestic demand as stock levels and world imports are driven down. 
Once that stock adjustment is complete then world imports tend to rise again, 
even though the underlying levels of demand are depressed. Thus we expect 
some increase in merchandise exports for this reason later this year. At the same 
time, significant new foreign direct investment in manufacturing took place in 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
5  The data for both exports and production in the pharmaceuticals sector was affected by the ending of patents in the 
final quarter 
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2011/12 and the expansion of some existing companies continued apace. Finally, 
with regard to the traditional sector, we expect the supply situation to improve. In 
terms of the time profile we expect the first half of the year to remain relatively 
weak but thereafter exports from the indigenous sector could resume growth. If 
this profile proves correct then merchandise exports may increase in volume 
terms by close to 2 per cent this year and 2.5 per cent in 2014. 
 
Tourism receipts in volume terms are expected to grow by about 3 per cent this 
year and slightly more in 2014. The numbers coming to Ireland from major 
markets are small relative to the size of these countries' overseas tourism. This 
may be one reason why numbers from North America and Europe have continued 
to grow. Tourists from Britain are a different matter – while the proportion of 
British tourists coming to Ireland is small, it is much larger than the proportion in 
other markets. A significant element of those from Britain is associated with 
visiting friends and relatives. Given the emphasis, through “The Gathering”, on 
attracting this part of the market (not just from Britain), we could expect an 
increase in numbers this year. 
 
Other service exports are expected to continue the fast growth of recent years at 
about 6 per cent in volume terms. There has been an increase in the number of 
firms and an expansion of existing firms, so that we would expect sales to grow 
rapidly. While these exports now outstrip merchandise exports, there are very 
significant management charges associated with their operation, so that the 
contribution to GNP per € exported is less than for manufacturing exports from 
multinationals. This sector is now driving growth of approximately 4 per cent in 
exports of goods and services, so that it is as well to recognise that the domestic 
impact on the economy of a 1 per cent rise in exports is now less than a decade 
ago. 
 
We expect overall exports of goods and services to grow by 3.9 per cent in volume 
terms in 2013 and further growth in the volume of overall exports of 4.9 per cent 
in 2014. 
 
TABLE 1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 2011 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Value Volume Change 
 € billion % % % % 
Merchandise 84.9 2.7 -2.5 1.8 3.5 
Tourism 3.3 4.0 0.5 3.0 3.5 
Other Services 78.2 7.9 8.5 6.0 6.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 166.8 5.1 2.7 3.9 4.9 
 
Note:  Value of total exports of goods and services includes FISM adjustment. 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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Investment 
 
The quarterly national accounts show that the volume of investment was broadly 
unchanged in the first nine months of 2012, when compared with the same 
period in 2011, while the value of investment increased by a marginal 0.6 per 
cent. In part the stabilisation of investment can be explained by increased 
investment in aeroplanes, while other investment remains weak. Available 
housing statistics suggest the volume of residential construction is likely to have 
fallen by approximately 20 per cent in 2012, so we estimate an overall decline in 
building and construction of 12.7 per cent in 2012. Imports of capital goods in the 
first eight months of 2012 are broadly unchanged from the same period in 2011. 
The registration of goods vehicles was also lower in 2012, down by over 3 per 
cent. When this is combined with an estimated increase in investment in 
machinery and equipment of 7 per cent, we are expecting that total investment 
will have contracted by 3.9 per cent in volume terms in 2012.  
 
FIGURE 2 Housing Market Indicators 
 
 
 
Given the low base to which investment has declined, any small upturn is likely to 
see this component make a positive contribution to growth in 2013 and 2014, 
following five years of contraction. There are some indications that activity in the 
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housing market is beginning to stabilise, see Figure 2, while house prices, as 
measured by the CSO, recorded some growth in the second half of the year. 
Some increase in the volume of commercial and industrial building is also likely, 
on the basis of the Foreign Direct Investment announcements for 2012 and the 
expectation that Ireland continues to be successful in attracting such flows. As 
outlined in the previous Commentary, the government’s stimulus package and 
spending by NAMA should also contribute to an increase in activity levels. In 
addition, some major public sector construction projects will increase 
construction activity over the forecast period. Partly driven by the number of 
projects, but also reflecting an improvement in the economic outlook we expect 
that investment in machinery and equipment will continue to grow in 2013 and 
2014. On the basis of the forecast for the components of investment, shown in 
Table 2, we are projecting that overall investment will grow by approximately 3 
per cent in 2013 and by 3.6 per cent in 2014.  
 
TABLE 2 Gross Fixed Capital Formation, % Change in Volume 
 
 2011 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Value Volume Change 
 € billion % % % % 
Housing 3.9 -11.9 -20.3 1.8 1.8 
Other Building 4.9 -18.7 -6.6 4.7 5.9 
Total Building and Construction 8.8 -15.8 -12.7 3.5 4.2 
Machinery and Equipment 7.3 -8.3 7.1 2.8 3.0 
Total 16.1 -12.6 -3.9 3.1 3.6 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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Incomes, Prices and Consumption 
 
Incomes 
The CSO’s advance estimate for 2012 shows income from agriculture falling by 
close to 9 per cent. When income in forestry and fishing is included the fall is 
estimated at approximately 8 per cent. Non-agricultural earnings data for the first 
nine months of 2012 increased marginally. However, the fall in overall 
employment means that we estimate aggregate non-agricultural earnings 
stabilised in 2012. With overall employee numbers forecast to remain unchanged 
in 2013 we are anticipating that aggregate non-agricultural earnings will increase 
by approximately 1.3 per cent. In 2014, we expect some growth in aggregate 
employment and average earnings to result in an increase of 2.3 per cent for non-
agricultural wages. Taking account of changes in other non-agricultural income 
and current transfers, gross personal income is forecast to grow by 1 per cent this 
year and by a further 1.7 per cent in 2014.  
 
When account is taken of our forecasts for personal disposable income and 
consumption, and data for the first nine months on personal savings from the 
Quarterly Institutional Sector Accounts, it seems likely that there was a small rise 
in personal savings in 2012. However, our view remains that households continue 
to be resource constrained and that in the current environment consumption is 
being maintained at the expense of savings. Thus, we expect the savings ratio to 
decline in 2013 to 5.3 per cent and to 5.1 per cent in 2014.  
 
Consumer Prices 
The annual average increase in the consumer price index for 2012 was 1.7 per 
cent. The overall rate of consumer price inflation is likely to rise again in 2013. 
Given the continued weakness in domestic demand and the open nature of the 
Irish economy the rise in inflation will primarily be the result of our expectation 
that import prices will remain strong. However, we expect inflation in 2013 or 
2014 will remain around 2 per cent, and it could be less if there are some gains in 
administrative prices, e.g. pharmaceutical prices, see Box 1. 
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TABLE 3 Inflation Measures 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Annual Change 
 % % % % 
Consumer Price Index 2.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 
Personal Consumption Deflator 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 
HICP 1.1 2.0 1.7 2.0 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Box 1: Behind the Headlines: Will Drug Prices Fall? 
 
Paul K. Gorecki 
 
Drug prices attract a lot of attention. Recent headlines vary from ‘New drug deal 
worth €400 million over three years,’ to ‘Bill promotes use of cheaper generic 
drugs by doctors’ to ‘The scandalous rise in drug costs needs to be tackled.’ Will 
drug prices fall to help hard pressed consumers and assist the HSE in reducing its 
drug budget? 
Let us start by dividing drugs into two broad categories: first, new drugs, subject 
to patent protection; and second, old drugs that no longer have patent 
protection.  New drugs are typically sold by the patent owner (or a licensee), 
while older drugs, especially if they are big sellers, are likely to also be sold by 
generic firms. 
The ex-factory price of a new drug in Ireland is the average price charged in a 
basket of nine other Member States, including some higher and some lower 
priced countries, in which the drug is available. Since Ireland tends to be an earlier 
adopter and any given new drug is often only available in a limited number of 
higher priced Member States, the initial price for a new drug in Ireland is usually 
high. As the drug becomes available in lower priced Member States in the basket, 
such as Spain, the price in Ireland drops.   
In ESRI research commissioned by the HSE6 it was suggested that new drug prices 
could be lowered by setting price equal to the lowest priced Member State in the 
basket of nine as the benchmark rather than the average. The evidence suggested 
this approach would lead to a reduction of between 20 to 25 per cent in new drug 
prices.  
Under the three year agreement between the Department of Health/HSE and the 
representative body for firms selling new drugs, which came into effect in 
November 2012, new drugs continue to be priced as the average of price across 
nine Member States. This suggests little change in the ex-factory price of new 
drugs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
6  Paul K Gorecki, Anne Nolan, Aoife Brick and Seán Lyons, 2012. Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland. Getting a Bigger 
Bang for the Buck. Research Series No. 24. Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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Turning now to the setting of the price of old drugs, where generic competition 
might be expected, the Health (Pricing and Supply of Medical Goods) Bill 2012 
promises to radically reform the price setting process by: 
(a) Charging the Irish Medicines Board with establishing a list of 
interchangeable pharmaceutical products. In other words, generic and 
patentee brands can be certified as interchangeable with one another. 
(b) Permitting the pharmacist to substitute a cheaper generic equivalent when 
a more expensive product has been prescribed. At present pharmacists 
must dispense the brand prescribed. 
(c) Establishing a single common reference price for a group of 
interchangeable drug products, which will be used as the reimbursement 
price for the HSE. 
(d) Patients may pay extra for a drug product that is priced above the 
reference price if they wish to do so. 
The critical issue in determining whether the price of old drugs with generic 
competition will fall is the reference price. In the ESRI research, it was suggested 
that for high volume old drugs where there was generic competition, a tendering 
process should be used to set the reference price with the winner supplying the 
market. Successful examples operate in New Zealand and the Canadian province 
of Saskatchewan. 
An alternative approach to setting the reference price is to request firms to quote 
prices to the HSE and then select the average or the lowest to set the reference 
price. The basis of the quote could be the usual and customary price charged by 
the firm or its actual selling price net of all discounts or its best available price.  
However, the disadvantage with this process is that drug firms have an incentive 
to quote prices to the HSE that are too high and then discount off this price to the 
pharmacist so as to obtain market share.   
The reference price could also be capped at a certain percentage of the 
originator’s price immediately prior to the loss of patent protection. The price cap 
could be based on the price decline experienced in jurisdictions with well 
functioning markets that are able to take advantage of generic competition. In  
Greece and Portugal, as part of their EU-IMF bailout packages, price caps of 40 
and 50 per cent have been set. Under recent agreements with industry in Ireland 
price caps have been set at 50 per cent, which is likely to lead to lower priced 
generics.7 
It is not yet clear how the reference price will be set. No details have been given in 
the Health (Pricing and Supply of Medical Goods) Bill 2012, the accompanying 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
7  This applies to the agreement between the generic manufacturers and the Department of Health and HSE, while in 
the agreement between the representative body of suppliers of new drugs and the Department of Health and the 
HSE, once a new drug comes off patent after November 2012, the patent owner will reduce price by 30 per cent 
immediately, a year later by 50 per cent of the original price. It should also be noted that under this agreement there 
will be a price review of patent protected medicines available under the HSE Community Drug Schemes prior to 2006. 
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Explanatory Memorandum or the prior Regulatory Impact Analysis. Some of the 
factors to be taken into account in determining the reference price are listed in 
the Bill, but this does not address the issue of the reference price setting 
mechanism. Hence, whether prices of old drugs subject to generic competition 
will fall due to the enactment of the Health (Pricing and Supply of Medical Goods) 
Bill 2012 cannot be predicted without information on the reference price setting 
mechanism. 
In summary, recent policy changes leave unchanged the method for determining 
the ex-factory price of new drugs. For old drugs where there is generic 
competition, while the Health (Pricing and Supply of Medical Goods) Bill 2012 is a 
radical move in the right direction, without knowing more about the reference 
price setting mechanism it is not possible to say whether prices will fall more than 
they otherwise would under recently negotiated agreements with industry. 
 
TABLE 4 Personal Disposable Income 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 €bn €bn €bn €bn 
Agriculture, etc. 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.5 
Non-Agricultural Wages 67.8 68.0 68.9 70.5 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 11.5 12.8 13.6 14.5 
  
   
 
Total Income Received 82.5 83.8 85.7 88.5 
Current Transfers 25.8 26.2 25.3 24.9 
  
   
 
Gross Personal Income 108.4 110.0 111.0 113.4 
Direct Personal Taxes 22.4 22.9 23.9 25.0 
  
   
 
Personal Disposable Income 85.9 87.1 87.1 88.4 
Consumption 81.3 81.6 82.5 83.4 
Personal Savings 4.6 5.5 4.5 4.9 
Savings Ratio 5.4 6.3 5.2 5.6 
Average Personal Tax Rate 20.7 20.9 21.5 22.1 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Personal Consumption 
The Quarterly National Accounts for the first nine months of 2012 show that the 
volume of personal consumption has continued to decline, down by 1.3 per cent 
compared with the same period in 2011. The value of personal consumption was 
marginally higher, although the increase, at 0.5 per cent was modest. The 
personal consumption deflator grew by 1.8 per cent.  
 
In 2012 retail sales in value terms fell by 0.7 per cent compared to 2011, while the 
volume decline was just over 1 per cent.  New car registrations were over 12 per 
cent lower in 2012 than in 2011. Although it remains weak, consumer sentiment in 
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2012 improved when compared with the previous year, with particularly weak 
levels in December, a feature of sentiment patterns in recent years, possibly 
reflecting a budget impact (see Figure 3). However, the index usually shows some 
recovery the following month, driven in part by the January sales. These short-term 
indicators coupled with unemployment remaining high result in our estimate of 
personal consumption contracting again, although the decline will not be as great 
as we have seen in recent years. We now expect that, in volume terms, personal 
consumption will have declined by 1 per cent in 2012. Allowing for an estimated 
personal consumption deflator of 1.4 per cent means that growth in the value of 
personal consumption of 0.4 per cent is estimated for 2012. 
 
FIGURE 3  Consumers’ Perception of Future Financial Situation and Consumer Sentiment 
 
 
Source:  KBC Bank/Economic and Social Research Institute. 
 
In 2013 we continue to forecast a weak labour market, and data from the Central 
Bank show ongoing deleveraging households (shown in Figure 4). Data for the 
second quarter of 2012 show outstanding loan liabilities of €179 billion (€38,900 
per capita), down from a peak of €204 billion (€45,400 per capita) in late 2008. 
This coupled with the impact of planned fiscal consolidation measures, means 
that we expect that personal consumption will contract again in 2013, although at 
0.5 per cent this contraction will be much more modest than the declines of 
recent years. If we are correct in this expectation then personal consumption will 
have contracted for three consecutive years and for five out of the six years 
between 2008 and 2013. As is shown in the accompanying Research Note 
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(O’Connell et al.) the fall in per capita consumption in Ireland from peak to date 
has been the most severe amongst both crisis and non-crisis countries. 
 
FIGURE 4 House Debt, Level and a Percentage of Personal Disposable Income 
 
 
Source:  Based on data from Central Bank of Ireland and Central Statistics Office. 
 
With economic growth prospects strengthening, accompanied by some 
improvements in the labour market and a continuation in the gradual climb of 
consumer confidence, we would expect to see a return to annual growth in 
personal consumption in 2014. However, additional budget consolidation measures 
to be introduced in December 2013 mean we are forecasting the volume of 
personal consumption will contract again by 0.5 per cent in 2014. 
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Public Finances 
 
The final exchequer returns for 2012 show a healthier public finance position than 
at budget time, mainly due to a better than anticipated revenue performance, 
particularly with respect to corporation tax and income tax receipts. 
 
For the year as a whole, overall tax revenue performed well. Despite the 
contraction in personal consumption, VAT revenue grew by 4.4 per cent, and 
although the labour market remained weak, income tax and universal social 
charge receipts increased by 10 per cent. Government expenditure in 2012 was 
broadly in line with budget targets, over-running by approximately €500 million. 
Over-runs in health and social protection, higher expenditure on debt servicing 
and a shortfall in PRSI receipts were also partially offset by under-spends in other 
areas. 
 
TABLE 5 Exchequer Finances 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Outcome 
€bn 
Estimate 
€bn 
Forecast 
€bn 
Forecast 
€bn 
Net current expenditure 48.0 49.6 50.0 49.0 
Net voted expenditure 41.4 41.5 40.3 38.7 
Non-voted expenditure 6.6 8.1 9.7 10.3 
  
   
 
Current Revenue 36.8 39.4 40.5 42.2 
 Tax revenue 34.0 36.6 38.2 40.4 
Non-Tax revenue 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.8 
  
   
 
Current Budget Balance -11.2 -10.1 -9.4 -6.8 
  
   
 
Capital Resources 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.6 
Capital Expenditure 16.2 7.1 7.8 7.2 
Capital Expenditure – Voted 4.3 3.5 3.1 2.9 
Capital Expenditure - non voted  11.9 3.6 4.7 4.3 
Capital Budget Balance -13.7 -4.8 -5.8 -5.6 
  
   
 
Exchequer Balance -24.9 -14.9 -15.2 -12.4 
as % of GDP -15.7 -9.1 -9.1 -7.0 
  
   
 
General Government Balance -20.2 -12.9 -12.6 -9.1 
as % of GDP -12.7 -7.9 -7.5 -5.1 
 
Source: Department of Finance and own forecasts. 
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Budget 2013 continues the fiscal consolidation begun in 2008. The budget was 
less progressive than previous budgets but overall the series of austerity budgets 
have been progressive8. 
 
Based on our estimate of nominal GDP for the year, the general government 
balance (the key indicator for the bailout programme) is estimated to be €12.9 
billion, or 7.9 per cent of GDP. This is well within the target deficit of 8.6 per cent. 
 
At this point in time it seems unlikely that this performance will be repeated in 
2013. Although an improvement in economic growth and labour market 
stabilisation will result in higher tax revenues, our expectation is that it will 
continue to be difficult to reduce expenditure levels in 2013 to the extent sought 
by government. However, there could be sufficient momentum in changes sought 
in the current Croke Park negotiations to provide a significant carryover into 2014. 
On the other hand, the ending of the interest payment holiday on the promissory 
notes will add substantially to national debt interest. The proceeds of the sale of 
the State’s €1 billion holding of Contingent Capital Notes in Bank of Ireland will 
reduce the Exchequer Borrowing Requirements (EBR) but does not affect the 
general government balance. The underlying position, once special receipts are 
discounted, is difficult so that the realisation of sustainable gains depends heavily 
on the successful completion of the current Croke Park negotiations. If these are 
successful then while the position this year, when one-off and special factors are 
discounted, may not be ideal, the stage will be set for realising the 2014 targets. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
8  “Austerity Was Toploaded In Earlier Budgets”, Tim Callan, Claire Keane, Michael Savage and John R. Walsh, The Irish 
Times, Friday, December 7, 2012. 
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Population and the Labour Market 
 
The recent Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) includes revisions 
based on the results of Census 2011 as well as containing data for the third 
quarter of 2012. Based on the Census results the population estimate for 
2011 was revised upwards by 90,600 to 4.57 million. The new QNHS shows 
that the difference is concentrated in age groups more likely to migrate – the 
revisions are discussed in detail in the accompanying Research Note 
(Timoney, 2013). Table 6 shows the population aged 15 years and over in 
quarter 2, 2011 broken down by age group. Most of the change is 
concentrated in the 20-24 (+48,900) and the 35-44 (+24,400) year age 
groups, with an additional increase of 11,900 in the 15-19 year old age 
group.   
 
TABLE 6 Working age population by age group, quarter 2, 2011, pre- and post-Census 2011 
 
 
Pre-Census 
Post- 
Census Change % Change 
Proportion of 
total Pre-
Census 
Proportion of 
total Post-
Census 
 
'000's '000's '000's % % % 
Age, Years 
      15-19 269.2 281.1 11.9 4.4 7.7 7.8 
20-24 249.8 298.7 48.9 19.6 7.1 8.3 
25-34 752.4 756.4 4.0 0.5 21.5 21.0 
35-44 668.2 692.6 24.4 3.7 19.1 19.2 
45-54 576.6 578.0 1.4 0.2 16.5 16.1 
55-59 243.9 243.5 -0.4 -0.2 7.0 6.8 
60-64 218.4 217.2 -1.2 -0.5 6.2 6.0 
65+ 524.2 531.6 7.4 1.4 15.0 14.8 
All 3,502.7 3,599.1 96.4 2.8 100.0 100.0 
 
 
QNHS labour market estimates have been revised to take account of the new 
population-based weights. While there is a noticeable impact on the level of 
employment and unemployment there is relatively little difference in rates. Revised 
employment numbers are shown in Figure 5. Employment is now estimated to be 
higher than the previously published results. The previously published employment 
estimate for the second quarter of 2012 was 1,787,900. The new estimate is 48,300 
higher, putting employment at 1,836,200. 
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FIGURE 5 Employment Level, 000s, Pre- and Post-Census 2011 Revisions 
 
 
Source:  Based on CSO data. 
 
Similarly, the overall number of persons unemployed was higher due to the higher 
population total. Unemployment in quarter 2, 2012 is now estimated at 323,000, 
having previously been estimated at 308,500. 
 
FIGURE 6 Unemployment Level, 000s. Pre- and Post-Census 2011 Revisions 
 
 
 
Source:  Based on CSO data. 
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The latest QNHS shows continued stabilisation of the labour market in 2012, with 
decreases in employment and the labour force considerably more moderate than 
those seen in the previous three years. In the third quarter, unemployment fell by 
3,400 on a seasonally adjusted basis compared to the same period in 2011, which is 
the first such decline since the first quarter of 2005. Unlike eight years ago, 
however, there is no concurrent rise in employment, labour force participation and 
net inward migration. Employment for 2012 is expected to have fallen by 16,800, 
while the participation rate fell to 59.9 per cent in the second and third quarters of 
2012, a low not seen since the second quarter of 2003. Net emigration, at 34,400, 
was 7,000 higher in the year to April 2012 than for the previous year. 
 
Following Census 2011 revisions to population and labour market statistics, the 
measured unemployment rate stood at 15.0 per cent in the first quarter of 2012. 
Since then there have been tentative improvements, and in the third quarter there 
were 318,300 unemployed, corresponding to an unemployment rate of 14.8 per 
cent. The Live Register standardised unemployment rate has ranged between 12 
and 15 per cent for the past 44 months. Data for the remaining three months of 
2012 point to a decrease in unemployment for the final quarter, and we are 
forecasting modest improvements to 14.6 per cent in 2013 and 14.3 per cent in 
2014. The falls in unemployment are not expected to reflect significant increases to 
employment, instead relating to on-going net outward migration. As discussed 
further in a Research Note in this Commentary, (Morgenroth, 2013), there is 
considerable variation in regional unemployment rates. The unemployment rate for 
all regions excluding Dublin and the South West was 16.4 per cent in the first 
quarter of 2012. 
 
The construction, transport and industrial sectors registered the biggest job losses 
in 2012, partially offset by gains in services other than financial services. Industrial 
production levels declined towards the end of 2012, largely attributable to the 
expiry of patents for pharmaceuticals. Combining this with an external environment 
that is expected to remain challenging during 2013 and 2014, reflected in falling 
goods exports, the outlook for employment expansion in the industrial sector has 
weakened somewhat. Following five years of contraction, employment in 
construction is forecast to be stable in 2013 and rising modestly in 2014, with 
positive contributions expected to arise from the planned investment stimulus and 
NAMA development projects. Further falls are foreseeable in financial services and 
in public administration and defence, while employment in many other sectors will 
show broad stability. 
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FIGURE 7  Change in Long-term Unemployment (quarterly data, annualised)
 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The share of long-term unemployment in total unemployment has more than 
doubled since the second quarter of 2009, and currently stands at 59 per cent. 
Recent trends have shown signs of stabilisation for the measure, owing to high 
emigration and the slowdown of employment contraction that has taken place 
during 2012. Figure 7 shows the movement for this measure since 2005. The third 
quarter of 2012 saw an increase of 1,300 compared to the same period in 2011. 
This was the smallest annual increase in five years, while male long-term 
unemployment fell for the first time since the first quarter of 2007, possibly due to 
emigration. 
 
Table 7 reflects revisions to labour market data post-Census 2011, with an 
additional 39,000 total at work in 2011 than previously estimated. The 
accompanying Research Note (Timoney, 2013) details the main adjustments made 
to the demographic profile for the inter-censal period. Following an estimated fall 
for 2012 of 16,800, employment is forecast to be flat for 2013, before increasing by 
6,700 for 2014. In contrast the labour force is expected to continue to decline, with 
the labour force participation rate is expected to remain below 60 per cent. The fall 
in unemployment, seen in the third quarter of 2012, is forecast to continue on an 
annual average basis for both 2013 and 2014; annual unemployment has not 
decreased since 2001 (when unemployment stood at 71,600).  
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TABLE 7 Employment and Unemployment
 
 Annual Averages, 000s 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Agriculture 83 84 84 84 
Industry 348 334 335 340 
of which: Construction 108 101 101 104 
Services 1,414 1,413 1,412 1,415 
     
Total at work 1,849 1,832 1,832 1,839 
     
of which: non-agri. employees 1,534 1,520 1,524 1,536 
                     self-employed 293 288 285 280 
     
Unemployed 317 322 314 307 
Labour Force 2,166 2,154 2,146 2,146 
Unemployment Rate, % 14.6 14.9 14.6 14.3 
Participation Rate, % 60.4 60.0 59.9 59.9 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
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Imports and the Balance of Payments 
 
Imports  
Imports of goods remained flat for most of 2012. For the first nine months goods 
imports were running 2 per cent in volume terms below their level in the 
corresponding period of 2011. Preliminary figures for October and November 
suggest continued weakness in the fourth quarter so that the volume of goods 
imports could be down by 1 per cent for the year.   
 
Services’ imports are now running at twice the level of goods imports, and are 
dominated by payments to parent companies arising from the very substantial 
service exports, primarily in the broad IT sector. Total services expenditure in 
volume terms increased by under 1 per cent in the first nine months of 2012 
compared with the same period in 2011. The number of Irish tourists holidaying 
abroad was virtually unchanged between 2011 and 2012, but we expect 
expenditure to have declined as people sought less expensive holidays. 
 
TABLE 8 Imports of Goods and Services, Percentage Change, Volume 
 
 2011 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Value,  
€bn 
Volume Change 
 % % % % 
Merchandise 48.3 -2.3 -1.0 3.0 4.2 
Tourism 5.0 -7.2 -0.5 -2.0 -4.0 
Other Services 78.2 1.4 0.6 5.5 5.0 
   
   
 
Imports of goods and services 131.9 -0.3 0.0 4.3 4.4 
 
Note:  Value of total imports of goods and services includes FISM adjustment. 
Source: Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Turning to 2013 and 2014 the continued weakness in domestic demand will keep 
imports of goods fairly flat. It is still difficult to gauge the car market, depreciation 
of much older vehicles associated with the surge in sales in 2000 suggests 
replacement needs will lead to increased sales in the near future, but the timing 
is uncertain. So far registrations seem to have been weak, although that could 
also reflect the change in the registration system. Aircraft purchases are also 
extremely volatile and it is difficult to forecast the extent to which aircraft 
purchases originating with Irish and Irish based companies will take place. These 
are now more driven by international markets than by domestic tourism activity. 
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Other aspects of domestic demand will remain weak so that imports of consumer 
goods will remain subdued, although the growth we are forecasting for 
merchandise exports will lead to an increase in material imports. Overall goods’ 
imports are forecast to increase by 3 per cent in volume terms in 2013 and by 4.5 
per cent in 2014. 
 
Imports of services are expected to increase sharply in 2013 and 2014. While 
tourism may remain fairly flat, and well below previous peak levels, other service 
imports will reflect the growth in service exports. Thus, we are forecasting that 
overall growth in imports of goods and services will amount to 4.3 per cent in 
2013 and by a similar amount in 2014. 
 
Balance of Payments 
 The balance of payments surplus is now estimated at €7.8 billion in 2012. The 
surplus overstates the fundamental underlying situation as the data are distorted 
by the inflow of profits from overseas multinationals which relocated their Head 
Office to Ireland, but not any of their productive activities. Their worldwide 
profits are treated as an inflow of factor payments to Ireland but these firms pay 
no profit tax in Ireland as a result of double tax agreements with other countries 
where their productive activities are located. These foreign earnings are to 
varying extents not distributed to shareholders of the companies and the effect 
of this is to artificially raise GNP and also Gross National Income (GNI) – the 
measure which is used to determine Ireland’s payments to EU funds. A similar set 
of transactions took place in the second half of 2010, and this was mostly 
unwound in 2011. This time the profit inflows occurred in the second and third 
quarters of 2012. The reasons for these book transactions appear to be fears of 
additional taxes in other jurisdictions.  
 
The effect of these transactions is to make the current account look stronger in 
the period when the transaction takes place and to worsen it when or if the 
positions are unwound. Measures of GNP are also distorted. We have argued 
previously that GNP is a more accurate measure of the experience of the Irish 
economy than GDP, but both measures must be treated with caution at present 
and the same types of transactions could take place in the future.  The gap 
between GDP and GNP is widening, when allowance is made for the distortion 
referred to above. Transfer pricing by multinationals operating in Ireland remains 
an issue, making interpretation of an aggregate figure difficult. 
 
Thus the figure for net factor payments is artificially low in 2012. In 2013 we 
forecast that net factor payments increase slightly, as we are assuming that there 
are no additional corresponding inflows from foreign multinationals and that they 
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will repatriate some of the inflows from 2012. In addition, national debt interest 
payments are set to rise sharply, as detailed in the section on the public finances, 
and to increase further in 2014.  
 
In spite of the caveat about the data, the underlying balance of payments surplus 
in 2012 is substantial, reflecting the continued growth in exports from 
multinationals in both goods and services. Our forecasts for 2013 and 2014 see 
the underlying surplus remaining high, with the payments surplus amounting to 
3.3 per cent of GDP by 2014.  Finally, it is worth noting that while the patent cliff 
has led to a reduction in the value of exports (and also a reduction in the volume 
of output as the wholesale price of such drugs is unchanged while the value of 
their sales and output falls) the effect on the balance of payments is slight, as the 
fall in the value of sales is reflected in a reduction in profits and hence net factor 
payments.  
 
TABLE 9 Balance of Payments 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 €bn €bn €bn €bn 
Exports of goods and services 166.8 176.9 188.0 203.6 
Imports of goods and services 131.9 136.8 145.6 155.1 
Net factor payments -31.8 -31.1 -36.9 -40.4 
Net transfers -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Balance on current account 1.9 7.8 4.3 6.9 
As a % of GNP 1.4 5.9 3.3 5.0 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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8 
 
Monetary Sector Developments 
 
Bank Funding  
Persistent stresses in the eurozone banking system moved centre stage again 
during the summer, with developments in Spain and Greece aggravating an 
already tense environment. These tensions have eased largely as a result of a 
timely intervention by the European Central Bank (ECB). Analysis of the domestic 
banking sector data, however, suggests that bank funding on the deposit side has 
fared better than might have been expected. While progress towards generating 
improved financial performance in the Irish banks has been slow to date, there 
have been some encouraging signs recently and moves by the European 
Commission to implement a single supervisory mechanism by end-2013 should 
also help to support access to market funding. 
 
Deposit funding at the covered Irish banks showed some resilience during 2012, 
partly reflecting restored confidence in the system.9 By December 2012, customer 
deposits (resident and non-resident) had risen by just over €16 billion from a 
trough of €140 billion in August 2011, with longer term deposits well 
represented.10 Indicative data suggest that roughly one-tenth of the near €9 
billion increase since December 2011 has been due to exchange rate revaluations. 
Data from the Central Bank suggest that deposits from resident businesses, Irish 
and non-Irish, made up the majority of the increase in the first three quarters of 
the year, although households also increased savings having declined in the same 
period of each of the previous three years.11 Attracting deposits has proven 
relatively more costly for Irish banks, although the costs associated with deposit 
funding have begun to improve of late (see Figure 8). Data available to November 
2012 show that the weighted average interest rate reported by Irish resident 
banks on term deposits placed by households and Non-Financial Corporations 
(NFCs) fell by 32 basis points from a recent peak of 3.39 per cent in April. From 
January to November 2012, Irish resident banks were paying close to 66 basis 
points per annum more than their eurozone counterparts on household and NFC 
term deposits. This gap had narrowed to 51 basis points by November, but 
remains costly. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
9   The Covered Banks include AIB Group (including EBS Building Society), Bank of Ireland Group, permanent tsb and Irish 
Bank Resolution Corporation. 
10   Note that these data come from the value series published by the Department of Finance. They exclude NTMA 
deposits held prior to re-capitalisation and AIB’s Polish operations, while they include the acquisition of Northern 
Rock deposits by permanent tsb. 
11  These figures adjust for changes in non-transaction related effects such as changes in reporting populations, 
revaluations and exchange rates by analysing cumulative transactions data. 
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Recent forays into more conventional market funding by Irish banks and the 
sovereign represent significant milestones in the road towards a return to more 
sustainable funding, and a reduced dependence on emergency borrowings from 
international monetary authorities. This access has been helped by ECB decisions 
to loosen certain collateral requirements and by the increased availability of 
liquidity prompted by central bank interventions throughout advanced 
economies. The reliance on Emergency Liquidity Measures (ELM) continues to 
decline at the covered banks (see Figure 9). Total Eurosystem borrowing is 
currently €106 billion, more than a third lower than the €159 billion early 2011 
peak, while emergency liquidity assistance from the Central Bank of Ireland is 
down over 40 per cent from a peak in the same period. Improved balance of 
payments surpluses, representing net lending to the rest of the world, are the 
counterpart of large Eurosystem borrowing. However, wholesale funding in June 
2012 represented a much lower share of bank funding than in previous years. 
Currently the equivalent to one-third of domestic credit institutions’ total assets, 
this share stood at 55 per cent in December 2008. As such, it is still difficult to 
envisage a significant re-engagement in lending to the domestic economy by 
domestic banks without a sustained improvement in funding conditions that is not 
derailed by further escalations in eurozone tensions. 
 
Other tentative signs of progress in reducing costs aside from those related to 
wholesale funding channels have been visible in the covered banks. The amount 
of liabilities covered by the costly Eligible Liabilities Guarantee Scheme (ELG) are 
steadily declining and net interest margins, while still very tight, are likely to 
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Source: Central Bank of Ireland, Money and Banking Statistics. 
* Average for deposits outstanding with agreed maturity. 
Source:  ECB Bank Lending Survey 2012. 
FIGURE 8 Average Household and NFC                
Deposit Rates* 
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improve on the back of attempts to reduce deposit costs and increase charge 
rates on loans. On-going reductions in operating costs are also progressing and 
deleveraging targets look likely to be met in 2013.  
 
Non-performing loans and rising mortgage arrears, in particular, remain a 
challenge to bank profitability, albeit the pace of the increase in the latter appears 
to have slowed more recently. Reduced downward pressure on employment and 
average earnings will have some bearing on slowing the pace of growth in arrears, 
although this is unlikely to result in a stabilisation in the near term given the force 
of momentum already built up. Furthermore, after-tax incomes are still likely to 
be hit in forthcoming Budgets, which will partly offset positive developments in 
earnings and employment. 
 
The priority remains getting the domestic banking system to a point where it can 
support the recovery. Achieving this goal is likely to be met only on a very gradual 
basis, however. While recent progress domestically has been somewhat 
favourable, further planned deleveraging across European banks in 2013 is likely 
to dampen prospects of obtaining renewed access to private sector funding 
channels at significant levels.12 While efforts by the ECB to relieve funding 
pressures on eurozone banks have slowed the pace of deleveraging, further 
progress is required to reduce perceived risks in the European financial system so 
that credit institutions can be put back on a stable path without the need for such 
large-scale asset reductions. Indeed, the European Commission’s proposals for a 
unified banking supervisory mechanism to be put in place by end-2013 represent 
a step in the right direction towards restoring confidence in the financial system. 
These proposals should be seen as one element in a suite of reforms required to 
improve the sustainability of the banking system. Commitments to remove the 
link between sovereigns and banking systems by enabling the direct 
recapitalisation of eurozone banks through the ESM should also be pursued, as 
should common deposit protection and a single bank resolution mechanism. The 
precise form these arrangements will take needs to be closely evaluated and 
monitored. Suggestions of complacency or of backsliding with respect to these 
necessary reforms are discouraging, in particular in light of the recent respite in 
markets. 
 
Recent Lending Developments 
Accounting for non-transaction related effects (relating to valuation/exchange 
rate changes and reclassifications), net lending to households can be seen to have 
continued to decline sharply during the first 11 months of 2012, falling by an 
average of 3.8 per cent, year-on-year. The annual decline in loans for house 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
12  IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2012.  
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purchases slowed to 1.6 per cent in November, representing the slowest pace of 
decline in this category since early 2011.13 Net lending (also excluding non-
transaction related effects) for buy-to-let properties fell by over €90 million in the 
third quarter of 2012, while lending directed towards principal dwellings 
contracted by €187 million, less than half of the €489 million fall in the second 
quarter. The effect of the 2012 year-end expiry of mortgage interest relief 
applicable to principal dwellings saw some reduction in the decline of such 
lending transactions. Consumer credit continues to register sharp declines, falling 
11.4 per cent on average from January to November of 2012, with the pace of 
these moderating very slowly. Reflecting ongoing balance sheet repair and the fall 
in bank lending, household debt continues to decline. On average, total household 
loan liabilities have fallen by slightly more than €2 billion every quarter since early 
2010. 
 
Data on lending to Irish resident Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) show 
continued reductions for each of the first three quarters of 2012. The most recent 
data registered a faster contraction of 2.7 per cent year-on-year, following a fall of 
1.7 per cent in the second quarter. ‘Core’ lending, to sectors outside of financial 
intermediation, construction and real estate activities, fell faster than the total 
once again, with a 4.9 per cent fall in the third quarter of 2012. These figures 
show a slowing pace of decline relative to the falls seen in 2011 for which data are 
available, but the picture remains one of continuing decline in SME lending 
activity. Transactions data for 12 of the main ‘core’ subsectors show that the only 
subsectors with an increase in net lending (i.e. gross new lending less repayments) 
in the first three quarters of 2012, when compared to the end of 2011, came in 
the form of modest increases for agriculture (€9 million), manufacturing (€5 
million), the electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply subsector (also €5 
million) and education (€13 million). By contrast, the remaining ‘core’ subsectors 
recorded a substantial net decrease in lending of some €959 million since the end 
of 2011 with the contraction in existing SME lending continuing to overshadow 
gross new lending.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
13  These growth rates adjust for changes in non-transaction related effects such as changes in reporting populations, 
revaluations and exchange rates. 
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TABLE 10 Lending to Irish Households and Irish Resident SMEs (% Change, Year-on-Year) 
 
 Irish Household Lending Small and Medium Enterprise Lending 
 End-
Month 
All Lending  For House 
Purchases 
Consumer  
Credit 
Total Total excl. 
Financial 
Intermediation 
Total excl. Financial 
Intermediation & 
Property Related 
Sectors 
2010 Mar -2.0 0.6 -10.6 - - - 
 Jun -3.1 -0.1 -11.7 - - - 
 Sep -3.7 -0.9 -12.7 - - - 
 Dec -4.7 -1.4 -19.9 - - - 
2011 Mar -4.2 -2.0 -13.7 -8.8 -11.3 -9.2 
 Jun -3.9 -2.2 -14.4 -9.1 -12.5 -10.6 
 Sep -4.0 -2.5 -13.7 -5.4 -8.2 -8.9 
 Dec -3.6 -2.5 -6.9 -3.0 -5.4 -6.2 
2012 Mar -3.9 -2.4 -11.6 -3.9 -4.9 -6.3 
 Jun -3.7 -2.2 -11.1 -1.7 -2.9 -4.6 
 Sep  -3.7 -2.0 -10.7 -2.7 -4.1 -4.9 
 Oct -3.7 -1.9 -11.0    
 Nov -3.6 -1.6 -11.7    
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland Money and Banking Statistics. 
 
Qualitative data on supply and demand conditions offer some insight as to the 
probable drivers behind lending developments. The results from the October 2012 
Bank Lending Survey suggest that Irish households’ demand for loans for house 
purchases expanded slightly in the third quarter, partly reflecting more upbeat 
prospects for the housing market as the mortgage interest relief scheme came to 
an end, yet credit standards attached to such lending showed further tightening 
during the same period.14 Further qualitative data released since the last 
Commentary came in the form of the ECB’s Survey on the Access to Finance of 
SMEs in the Euro Area (SAFE) covering the period April to September of 2012, and 
the Red C conducted SME Credit Demand Survey published by the Department of 
Finance. These reports include responses from a sample of Irish SMEs concerning 
their financing, through bank loans, overdrafts, trade credit, debt securities and 
equity. The findings of the two surveys are somewhat contrasting; for example, 
the ECB survey portrayed a more negative picture with respect to the quantity of 
loan applications made than the Red C survey showed. However, it should be 
noted that the sample size is much larger in the Red C survey. There were minor 
improvements to perceptions of availability for all categories of external 
financing, according to the ECB’s SAFE. Overall, large lending constraints remain, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
14  The ECB’s Eurozone Bank Lending Survey gives some impression of banks’ willingness to lend, showing changes in 
their credit standards and in terms and conditions attached to lending. It is addressed to senior lending officers in 
participating banks, 5 of whom are from Ireland. Changes in credit standards over the past three months are 
examined, with respondents indicating to what extent they feel that credit standards have deteriorated or eased over 
the recent quarter. 
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with the reported cost of financing higher as banks attempt to improve net 
margins. 
 
One-third of the SMEs that applied for loans during the recent survey period said 
that they received the entire loan amount, down from half in the previous six 
month period; however, there is a large share of “Don’t Know” responses in the 
more recent survey. When those are excluded, this proportion rises to 44 per 
cent. The decline is larger for those receiving at least a partial approval, down 
from 70 per cent previously to 48 per cent in the current survey. Consistent with 
these changes, the share of firms that applied for loans but were rejected 
increased from 17 per cent to 23 per cent. A similar pattern was found for 
overdraft applicants, whereby a higher share of applications were rejected and a 
lower share approved. Despite these adverse developments, firm perceptions of 
deteriorated credit availability were effectively unchanged, and the share citing 
banks’ willingness to lend as a factor behind these perceived deteriorations 
remained at 38 per cent. The share of firms actually applying for bank loans over 
the period also declined (down from 22 per cent to 16 per cent). Of those that did 
not apply, the share that reported not having done so due to possible rejection 
(15 per cent) was effectively unchanged. Instead more firms reported not applying 
for such lending during this period due to reported availability of sufficient 
internal funds and other reasons. The funding position of SMEs may improve with 
the support of the new Strategic Investment Fund. 
 
The perceived cost of financing may have been another issue, with more SMEs 
surveyed reporting higher interest rates and other costs as well as reduced loan 
maturities. However, the share of firms that applied for and refused credit 
afterwards due to the cost being too high was relatively small (up from 3 per cent 
to 5 per cent). It is more likely that firms have reduced their need for loans due to 
other reasons such as weaker demand conditions. For example, the share of Irish 
SMEs reporting an increase in their need for bank loans was unchanged from the 
last six month period (18 per cent), yet a larger share of firms reported decreased 
needs (up from 9 per cent to 12 per cent). By contrast, the Red C survey pointed 
to a small increase of demand for bank finance, with 39 per cent of the surveyed 
SMEs submitting applications, and 60 per cent obtaining either full or partial 
approval. 
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9 
 
General Assessment of the Irish Economy 
 
Economic Outlook 
Against the backdrop of continued uncertainty regarding the European debt crisis 
and slowing international economic growth, particularly in Europe and the UK, the 
Irish economy is estimated to have grown by approximately 1 per cent in real GDP 
in 2012 and to have achieved a significant improvement in the public finances. As 
in recent years, growth has been driven by the performance of the external sector 
of the economy, particularly services, while domestic demand continues to 
contract in the face of high unemployment, austerity measures and deleveraging.  
 
Although many of the uncertainties remain, it is likely that the Irish economy will 
continue to grow modestly in 2013 and 2014. Our present forecast is for an 
increase in real GDP of 1.4 per cent in 2013 and 1.7 per cent in 2014. The terms of 
trade are expected to improve by 2014, following several years of deterioration. 
The modest growth will continue to be driven primarily by the external sector, 
although our expectation is that some recovery in domestic demand is likely to 
contribute to growth over the forecast period. If our forecasts are broadly correct 
then the period 2011-2014 will represent the first period of annual consecutive 
growth in GDP since the commencement of the crisis. 
 
In recent years the GNP measure of the Irish economy has been distorted by the 
movement of profits by UK domiciled multinationals, as outlined in our discussion 
of the balance of payments (Section 7). GNP is set to have increased by 3 per cent 
in 2012, but is due to fall back by 2 per cent in 2013, before growth of 1.4 per cent 
in 2014. The underlying change in GNP between 2012 and 2014 is about 0.5 per 
cent each year. 
 
Our forecasts indicate that the fiscal targets set for 2013 could be difficult to 
meet. The revenue figures are realisable, but the expenditure targets may be 
more challenging. The sale of the contingent capital holding in Bank of Ireland is 
sufficiently large to ensure that the overall EBR target is met. In the short term 
one-off receipts can be used to keep the outturn within the targets, but a more 
sustainable set of measures is needed for the medium term. Faster growth in the 
world economy would ease the situation, but policy cannot be predicated on an 
assumption of this. A deal on the promissory notes would also ease the situation, 
but there would still be much to do. The promissory note situation has been 
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extensively analysed by Whelan (2012).15 He concluded that the best approach 
would be a long delay in promissory note repayment and a slower pace of ELA 
repayment, agreed with the ECB. This may be the best that can be hoped for. A 
potential solution we have argued for in previous Commentaries is a monetising of 
the debt associated with Anglo Irish Bank and the Irish Nationwide Building 
Society and the debt associated with the recapitalisation of the covered banks.  
 
Unemployment 
The rate of unemployment remains above 14 per cent and while some reduction 
is forecast over the next two years, the driving force behind this is net outward 
migration. The scale of the unemployment crisis is further masked by a reduced 
participation rate where discouraged workers opt out of the labour force when 
jobs are difficult to hold and to get. The rate of long-term unemployment has 
continued to increase. Long-term unemployment is a particular problem because 
of deskilling both in relation to specific skills and in relation to work practices. It 
also has intergenerational consequences. Even if there is no immediate prospect 
of employment, the potential current and future costs are sufficiently large both 
from a personal and societal perspective to consider what measures might help to 
maintain peoples’ contact with the labour market. This issue has been extensively 
covered in ESRI papers, in relation to the 1980s crisis and the current one16. The 
research has indicated some guiding principles: activation should begin as soon as 
a person becomes unemployed and should be given to all of working age who are 
not working; people’s attempts to obtain work should be monitored regularly; 
and finally non-compliance should be met by sanctions. The newly introduced 
Intreo service offers a comprehensive approach to help jobseekers, but the 
service needs to be expanded rapidly, as it is currently being rolled out on a 
phased basis.  
 
Adjustment in the Economy 
As the economy faces into the fifth year of the Great Recession, there are no 
obvious signs that the major European economies are pulling out of recession.  
Indeed, the fear is that the recession may be gathering pace and that eurozone 
output could contract in 2013 under the continued impact of austerity measures 
now introduced widely across Europe. This will render Ireland’s task of correcting 
the public finances, restoring balance to private debt levels, reducing 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
15  Whelan, Karl., “ELA, Promissory Notes and All That: The Fiscal Cost of Anglo Irish Bank”. The Economic and Social 
Review, Vol. 43 No. 4, Winter 2012, pp.653-673. 
16  McGuinness, S., P.J. O’Connell and E. Kelly (2011). “One Dummy Won’t Get it: The Impact of Training Programme 
Type and Duration on the Employment Chances of the Unemployed in Ireland”, ESRI Working Paper 410. Dublin: 
Economic and Social Research Institute. 
Kelly, E., S. McGuinness and P.J. O’Connell (2011). “What Can Active Labour Market Policies Do?” ESRI Economic 
Renewal Series 001. Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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unemployment and returning to a stable long-run growth profile much more 
difficult. The economy has some experience of adjustment in the past. In the late 
1950s the shift from inward looking to outward looking policies was a policy 
induced adjustment, while in the mid-1980s the shift to exports was made 
possible, not just by a favourable international climate, but also by market-driven 
changes which reduced wage inflation. In both cases the adjustment involved 
major changes for some groups in society. While the earlier adjustment is now 
seen through rose-tinted glasses, there were significant losers as well as gainers. 
The adjustment that took place resulted in the demise of many firms whose 
existence was due to the protectionism of the previous quarter century. The 
firms, owners and workers displaced by the removal of protection did not step 
easily into new activities. In the mid-1980s workers suffered real income declines 
and very high levels of unemployment before the adjustment got underway, and 
the rewards, in the form of full employment, took nearly a decade to realise. An 
important part of adjustment is the acceptance that there are potential losers, 
usually readily identifiable, while the potential winners are unknown and 
uncertain. Where adjustment is policy-driven a significant constraint policymakers 
face is the resistance to change by potential losers in an attempt to maintain their 
position.  
 
For example, if there are significant market distortions which keep the price level 
too high then tackling these distortions will help lead to a lower price level. Some 
progress has already been made on this front. Since the crisis began Irish price 
levels have come down from 122 per cent of the EU average in 2008 to 109 per 
cent in 2011.17 The Troika have identified legal and medical services as two areas 
where restrictions on entry and competition have resulted in relatively high prices 
facing consumers and business. Domestic pricing relationships can also be a 
source of prices that are too high. Prescription drugs are a case in point (Box 1). 
The level of Irish prices on average in 2012 was just under 3 per cent higher than 
in 2007, using both the CPI and the HICP as the measure. The price level remains 
high, though competition has forced down prices in some retail areas. 
Furthermore, the continued expansion of grocery discounters could help to 
reduce margins and prices in the grocery trade.  
 
Changes in pay and conditions of work would be more palatable if accompanied 
by a lower price level. Public sector pay remains high relative to private sector 
pay. Research shows the overall public sector pay premium has reduced (CSO, 
2012; Kelly et al., 2013, this issue). However, the premium is still positive, though 
not identical across the public service earnings distribution, nor across all sectors 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
17  Eurostat data on comparative price levels 
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of the public service (Kelly et al. 2009, CSO, 2012).18 The proposed extension to 
the Croke Park Agreement represents an attempt to deal with the pay issue, 
within the context of the need for further sustainable fiscal adjustment. As we 
understand it, the proposals encompass: pay cuts, longer working hours, changing 
increments, a cut in overtime rates, and changes in work practices. In previous 
Commentaries we have argued in favour of cutting pay rather than numbers as a 
means of reducing the overall cost of services while seeking to preserve the level 
of services. The original agreement excluded further pay cuts as an option. Hence 
in the last Commentary we argued that if pay levels were sacrosanct, then to 
maintain services it would be necessary to increase the output per person in the 
public sector. The reported proposals may go some way to realising both 
approaches, payroll cost reductions and more output per person. 
 
Controlling payroll costs is particularly important where the level of expenditure is 
to some extent demand driven, for example, in health services. Hospitals do not 
have the option of turning away seriously ill people. Where payroll costs are 
managed through delaying procedures for non-life-threatening illness, the 
consequence are borne by those requiring treatment. Without adjustment in the 
public sector, it is difficult to see how the expenditure targets can be met without 
a major cost in terms of service reduction. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
18  Central Statistics Office, 2012. National Employment Survey 2009 and 2010 Supplementary Analysis, October.  
Kelly, E., S. McGuinness and P. O’Connell, 2009. “The Public-Private Sector Wage Gap in Ireland: What Lies Beneath?”, 
ESRI Working Papers, No. 321.  
Kelly, E., S. McGuinness and P. O’Connell, 2012. “Comparing Public and Private Sector Pay in Ireland: Size Matters”, 
Research Note, ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, this issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 
2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 % change in 2014 2014 
 
€bn Value Volume €bn Value Volume €bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 84.9 2.4 2.7 86.9 4.9 1.8 91.1 7.6 3.5 98.0 
Tourism 3.3 1.9 4.0 3.3 4.7 3.0 3.5 5.2 3.5 3.7 
Other Services 78.2 10.2 7.9 86.2 7.7 6.0 92.8 9.1 6.3 101.2 
Exports Of Goods and Services 166.3 6.1 5.1 176.4 6.2 3.9 187.4 8.3 4.9 202.9 
FISM Adjustment 0.5 
  
0.5 
  
0.6   0.6 
Adjusted Exports 166.8 6.1 5.1 176.9 6.2 3.9 188.0 8.3 4.9 203.6 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 Investment 
 
 
2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 % change in 2014 2014 
 
€bn Value Volume €bn Value Volume €bn Value Volume €bn 
Housing 3.9 -18.7 -20.3 3.2 3.8 1.8 3.3 3.8 1.8 3.4 
Other Building 4.5 -6.3 -7.3 4.2 5.7 4.7 4.5 6.7 5.7 4.8 
Transfer Costs 0.4 2.0 -0.0 0.4 6.1 5.0 0.4 9.1 8.0 0.4 
Building and Construction 8.8 -11.4 -12.7 7.8 5.0 3.5 8.2 5.7 4.2 8.6 
Machinery and Equipment 7.3 6.4 7.1 7.8 2.1 2.8 7.9 2.2 3.0 8.1 
Total Investment 16.1 -3.3 -3.9 15.6 3.5 3.1 16.1 3.9 3.6 16.8 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
 
2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 % change in 2014 2014 
 
€bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn % €bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 3.2 -8.0 -0.3 3.0 7.5 0.2 3.2 8.5 0.3 3.5 
Non-Agricultural Wages 67.8 0.4 0.3 68.0 1.3 0.9 68.9 2.3 1.6 70.5 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 11.5 11.0 1.3 12.8 6.3 0.8 13.6 6.5 0.9 14.5 
Total Income Received 82.5 1.5 1.3 83.8 2.3 1.9 85.7 3.2 2.8 88.5 
Current Transfers 25.8 1.6 0.4 26.2 -3.7 -1.0 25.3 -1.4 -0.3 24.9 
Gross Personal Income 108.4 1.6 1.7 110.0 0.9 0.9 111.0 2.2 2.4 113.4 
Direct Personal Taxes 22.4 2.3 0.5 22.9 4.2 1.0 23.9 4.6 1.1 25.0 
Personal Disposable Income 85.9 1.3 1.2 87.1 0.0 0.0 87.1 1.5 1.3 88.4 
Consumption 81.3 0.4 0.3 81.6 1.1 0.9 82.5 1.1 0.9 83.4 
Personal Savings 4.6 18.3 0.8 5.5 -17.3 -0.9 4.5 8.8 0.4 4.9 
Savings Ratio 5.4 
  
6.3 
  
5.2 7.2  5.6 
Average Personal Tax Rate 20.7 
  
20.9 
  
21.5 2.4  22.1 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A4 Public Finances, Exchequer 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Outcome, €bn Outcome, €bn Estimate, €bn Forecast, €bn Forecast, €bn 
Net Current Expenditure 47.0 48.0 49.6 50.0 49.0 
Net Voted Expenditure 40.5 41.4 41.5 40.3 38.7 
Non-Voted Expenditure 6.5 6.6 8.1 9.7 10.3 
Current Revenue 34.4 36.8 39.4 40.5 42.2 
Tax Revenue 31.8 34.0 36.6 38.2 40.4 
Non-Tax Revenue 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.8 
Current Budget Surplus -12.6 -11.2 -10.1 -9.4 -6.8 
Capital Resources 1.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.6 
Capital Expenditure 8.0 16.2 7.1 7.8 7.2 
Capital Expenditure – Voted 5.9 4.3 3.5 3.1 2.9 
Capital Expenditure - Non Voted  2.0 11.9 3.6 4.7 4.3 
Capital Borrowing -6.2 -13.7 -4.8 -5.8 -5.6 
Exchequer Balance -18.7 -24.9 -14.9 -15.2 -12.4 
as % of GDP -12.0 -15.7 -9.1 -9.1 -7.0 
General Government Balance -48.4 -20.2 -12.9 -12.6 -9.1 
as % of GDP -30.9 -12.7 -7.9 -7.5 -5.1 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A5 Public Finances, National Accounts 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
€bn €bn €bn €bn €bn 
Total Receipts : Current 49.8 50.5 52.3 53.4 55.4 
Total Receipts : Capital 0.8 1.4 2.1 1.9 1.8 
Total Receipts - Current And Capital 50.6 51.9 54.4 55.3 57.2 
Total Expenditure – Current 61.7 61.2 62.3 63.5 62.5 
Total Expenditure – Capital 37.3 10.7 4.9 4.4 3.8 
Total Expenditure - Current And Capital  99.0 71.9 67.2 67.9 66.3 
General Govt. Balance -48.4 -20.2 -12.9 -12.6 -9.1 
As % of GDP -30.9 -12.7 -7.9 -7.5 -5.1 
 FORECAST TABLE A6 Imports of Goods and Services 
 
 
2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 % change in 2014 2014 
 
€bn Value Volume €bn Value Volume €bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 48.3 4.4 -1.0 50.4 5.6 3.0 53.2 6.8 4.2 56.8 
Tourism 5.0 2.5 -0.5 5.2 0.5 -2.0 5.1 -1.6 -4.0 5.0 
Other Services 78.2 3.4 0.6 80.9 7.4 5.5 86.8 6.9 5.0 92.8 
Imports of Goods and Services 131.5 3.7 0.0 136.4 6.4 4.3 145.2 6.6 4.4 154.7 
FISM Adjustment 0.3 
  
0.4 
  
0.4   0.4 
Adjusted Imports 131.9 3.7 0.0 136.8 6.4 4.3 145.6 6.6 4.4 155.1 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A7 Balance of Payments 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
€bn €bn €bn €bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 166.8 176.9 188.0 203.6 
Imports of Goods and Services 131.9 136.8 145.6 155.1 
Net Factor Payments -31.8 -31.1 -36.9 -40.4 
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Balance on Current Account 1.9 7.8 4.3 6.9 
As a % of GNP 1.4 5.9 3.3 5.0 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A8 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 83 84 84 84 
Industry 348 334 335 340 
Of which: Construction 108 101 101 104 
Services 1414 1413 1412 1415 
Total at Work 1849 1834 1833 1840 
Unemployed 317 322 314 307 
Labour Force 2166 2156 2146 2147 
Unemployment Rate, % 14.6 14.9 14.6 14.3 
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ESRI Research Note 2012/4/1 
Tax and Taxable Capacity: 
Ireland in Comparative Perspective 
 
T. Callan, M. Savage 
 
Introduction 
What role can increases in tax revenue be expected to play in Ireland’s transition 
to a new long-run fiscal equilibrium? Ireland is widely perceived as having had a 
low tax regime through the boom and bubble period. Tax increases have featured 
strongly as part of Ireland’s economic adjustment programme. How much scope 
is there for further increases? Has Ireland come close to the limits of tax revenue 
from incomes? In this note, we provide some international perspectives on these 
issues. We build on the approach proposed by the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council – a 
hybrid measure of GDP and GNP to represent Ireland’s taxable capacity – to 
provide more meaningful comparisons of tax ratios in Ireland and in other EU 
countries. 
 
Measuring Taxable Capacity 
GDP is commonly used as a broad indicator of taxable capacity in international 
comparisons, with ratios of tax revenue to GDP indicating the extent to which 
that capacity is used. For most countries, levels of GDP and GNP are quite similar. 
Table 1 shows that Ireland and Luxembourg are outliers in the EU-27, with GDP  
more than 20 per cent higher than GNP. The difference between the two is net 
factor payments, outflows which are largely due to the repatriation of profits by 
multinational companies. For the other 13 countries in the EU-15 group the ratio 
of GDP to GNP is close to unity (within the range 97 per cent to 104 per cent).  
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TABLE 1 Ranking of EU 27 Countries by Ratio of GDP to GNP, 2011 
 
Country GDP to GNP ratio 
Luxembourg  1.39 
Ireland  1.24 
Czech Republic  1.08 
Malta  1.07 
Estonia  1.05 
Hungary  1.05 
Poland  1.05 
Lithuania  1.04 
Portugal  1.04 
Greece  1.03 
Bulgaria  1.03 
Slovakia  1.02 
Spain  1.02 
Slovenia  1.01 
Austria  1.01 
Romania  1.01 
Italy  1.01 
Cyprus  1.00 
Latvia  0.99 
Finland  0.99 
Netherlands  0.99 
United Kingdom  0.99 
Belgium  0.99 
Sweden  0.98 
Germany  0.98 
France  0.98 
Denmark  0.97 
 
Source:  European Commission website, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/ series UVGD (Gross Domestic Product) and 
UVGN (Gross National Income) 
Note:   EU-15 countries are in italics. 
 
 
McCarthy (2004, 2010) has argued that the lower potential tax yield from net 
factor outflows means that, faced with a choice between GDP and GNP as a 
measure of taxable capacity, it is GNP which should be preferred. The Irish Fiscal 
Advisory Council (IFAC, 2012) reconsidered these arguments and came to the 
view that 
Taking either of the extremes of GDP or GNP is problematic. GDP is 
problematic as a measure of fiscal capacity because a euro of the excess of 
GDP over GNP (which is dominated by multinational profits) is likely to 
provide less revenue capacity than a euro of GNP. On the other hand, going 
to the other extreme of using just GNP puts zero weight on the revenue 
potential of the excess component. This suggests the value of a hybrid 
measure, where an appropriate relative value is placed on a euro of the 
excess component relative to a euro of GNP. 
 
Econometric analysis by IFAC suggests that a hybrid measure, using all of GNP 
and 40 per cent of the excess of GDP over GNP (i.e., 40 per cent of net factor 
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outflows) may provide a useful alternative measure of fiscal capacity. In our view 
this hybrid measure is better than either GNP or GDP alone, and the conclusions 
we draw from this approach are valid for a range of values around the central 
estimate.1 
 
One interpretation of these results is that the estimates reflect the low rates of 
corporation tax which have been in force in Ireland for many years. In principle, it 
could be argued that the taxable capacity of net factor outflows (what IFAC terms 
the excess of GDP over GDP) is greater than that estimated on this basis. There 
are, however, three considerations which suggest that the future taxable capacity 
of net factor income from abroad may be no higher than that estimated from the 
past. 
 
1. The highest effective tax rates on corporate profits are found in the five 
largest EU economies (Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain) and also 
in Malta. For almost all other EU countries, the effective rates are between 
10 and 25 per cent.  (Elschner and Vanborren, 2009, using the Devereux-
Griffith approach to identifying the effective average tax rate on corporate 
profits – see Devereux and Griffith, 2003, for details of the approach.) 
2. Work by Conefrey and FitzGerald (2011) finds that a cut in corporation 
profits tax led to a rise in activity; a rise in tax would therefore be expected 
to reduce the base to which the profits tax applied. 
3. Moves towards a common consolidated corporation tax base, using such 
metrics as sales or employment, would tend to apportion more of 
corporation tax receipts to larger countries. 
 
For these reasons we assume, in what follows that the effective tax rate applying 
to the profits of multinational companies operating in Ireland remains close to 
current levels. 
 
International Comparisons 
To date, comparisons of Ireland’s tax to national income ratio with those of other 
countries have been based largely on OECD statistics, which use GDP as the 
denominator for all countries. For the reasons set out above, we argue that this is 
not an appropriate measure in the Irish context. Here we present results on the 
basis of the hybrid measure proposed by IFAC (Table 2). When this correction for 
the effective size of the tax base is used, Ireland’s tax to national income ratio is 4 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  Net factor outflows are net of Irish tax paid by multinationals. In principle, it would be preferable to estimate a 
regression based on total multinational profits, and the remainder of GDP; but the broad import of the results for 
present purposes would be similar. 
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percentage points higher than the tax/GDP ratio commonly used. Ireland remains 
a relatively low tax country – but is no longer an outlier; instead it has a slightly 
higher tax to income ratio than Spain, Greece and Portugal in the EU-15. The 
severity of the recession in Ireland makes it likely that an economic upturn will 
tend to raise Ireland’s tax ratio relative to countries currently experiencing less 
severe downturns. 
 
TABLE 2 Total Taxes as a Proportion of National Income, EU-15 countries, 2011  
 
Country 
Percentage of National 
Income 
IRELAND–GDP 28.5 
Greece 31.2 
Portugal* 31.3 
Spain 31.6 
IRELAND–hybrid GDP and GNP 32.5 
United Kingdom 35.5 
Germany 37.1 
Luxembourg 37.1 
Netherlands* 38.7 
Austria 42.1 
Italy 42.9 
Finland 43.4 
Belgium 44.0 
France 44.2 
Sweden 44.5 
Denmark 48.1 
 
Source:  OECD Revenue Statistics, www.oecd.org 
Notes:  Taxes on individual income constructed from OECD categories 1100 (Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains of individuals) 
plus Social Security Contributions (category 2000, including contributions by employees, employers and self-employed). Income 
tax and capital gains taxes on corporations are not included. 
*  Indicates that 2010 is the latest available year. 
 
Even within the EU-15 countries, there is a wide range of tax to GDP ratios – from 
31 or 32 per cent in Spain, Greece and Portugal to 48 per cent in Denmark. There 
is therefore, considerable variation between countries in the set of government 
provided services and redistributive transfers that these societies are willing to 
finance. (For a historical perspective, see the ESRI Geary lecture by Besley, 2012). 
 
Next we focus on taxes relating to individual income. Broad measures of income 
taxes tend to include income taxes and capital gains taxes paid by corporations, 
but these are excluded here, as the factors driving them are quite different. In 
Table 3 we use the detailed OECD statistics to include income tax and social 
security contributions, excluding corporate income taxes. Net factor outflows 
from repatriated profits do not form part of the base for such income taxes: GNP 
is a more appropriate measure. Thus, for Ireland, we present a figure based on 
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GDP (as commonly shown in international comparisons) and a figure based on 
GNP, which we argue gives a more appropriate comparison. 
 
TABLE 3 Taxes on income of individuals as a proportion of national income, 2011 
 
Country Percentage of National Income 
Ireland–GDP  13.8  
Portugal*  14.6  
Greece*  15.3  
United Kingdom  16.8  
Ireland–GNP  17.3  
Spain  19.2  
Luxembourg  19.2  
Sweden  22.4  
Netherlands*  22.7  
Germany  23.5  
France  24.3  
Austria  24.4  
Italy  24.5  
Finland  25.3  
Belgium  26.5  
Denmark  27.6  
 
Source:  OECD Revenue Statistics, www.oecd.org. 
Notes:  Taxes on individual income constructed from OECD categories 1100 (Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains of individuals) 
plus Social Security Contributions (category 2000, including contributions by employees, employers and self-employed). Income 
tax and capital gains taxes on corporations are not included. 
*   Indicates that 2010 is the latest available year. 
 
As with the overall tax ratio, Ireland emerges as one of a group of low tax rate 
countries, rather than the very lowest. Using the more appropriate GNP-based 
figure, Ireland’s income tax to national income ratio is 17.3 per cent – about 3½ 
per cent higher than the GDP based figure. This is slightly higher than in the UK, 
and above the levels in Greece and Portugal – whereas the GDP based figures 
suggest that Ireland has the lowest rate in the EU-15. 
 
Similar average tax rates may have quite different implications for the marginal 
tax rates faced by individuals – much depends on the extent of exclusions from 
the tax base and the rate structure of the income-related taxes. Detailed  
microsimulation analysis is needed to assess the impact of different tax systems 
on the effective marginal tax rates faced by individuals in different countries. 
There has been limited cross-country analysis on this topic (Immervoll, 2004, is 
one such study, but the data and policies in this analysis are from the mid-1990s). 
However, recent studies by Adam and Browne (2010) for the UK and by Callan et 
al. (2011) for Ireland suggest that there may be scope for a bilateral comparison, 
based on models which have a very similar framework.  
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Taxes on expenditure vary much less across the EU. This may be partly due to the 
introduction of explicit harmonization, but competitive pressures may also 
contribute to this result. For 11 out of the EU-15 countries, including Ireland, the 
share of such taxes in GDP was between 10 and 12½ per cent in 2010. Higher 
values of between 13 and 15 per cent are recorded in Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark. Thus, the gap between the Irish tax ratio and that in the highest taxed 
countries is much less for this form of tax. 
 
Conclusions 
In the diagnosis of Ireland’s public finance crisis, there has been a widespread 
perception of Ireland as having become a “low tax” economy over the boom and 
bubble period, with income taxes in particular cut to low levels while stamp 
duties and capital gains taxes sustained the public purse. There is a great deal of 
truth in this diagnosis. However, international comparisons based on GDP give 
rise to an exaggerated picture. Taxes on corporate profits tend to be lower than 
average tax rates on GNP in all EU 15 countries; and the size of the flow of 
repatriated profits from Ireland is particularly large. The hybrid measure 
examined by IFAC provides a useful approach in adjusting the size of the 
estimated tax base. When this is done Ireland’s tax ratios are significantly higher 
than GDP-based figures would suggest.2 They place Ireland in a group of low tax 
rate countries that includes Spain, Greece and Portugal. Similar remarks apply 
when focusing on individual income tax and social security contributions, where 
Ireland had a slightly higher tax ratio than the UK in 2011. Comparisons of 
marginal effective tax rates, based on detailed microsimulation analysis, would be 
of value and possible approaches to this are being examined. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2  By the same token, calculations of expenditure to national income ratios would also show higher figures in relation to 
the hybrid construct. 
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ESRI Research Note 2012/4/2 
 
Comparing Public and Private Sector Pay in 
Ireland: Size Matters 
 
Elish Kelly, Seamus McGuinness and Philip O’Connell (UCD Geary 
Institute) 
 
The issue of public sector pay levels has been to the fore since the current 
economic downturn began in 2008, in the context of efforts aimed at reducing 
the public sector pay bill as a means of reducing Ireland’s fiscal deficit. The issue 
is topical again given the current negotiations between the trade unions and the 
government on a possible extension of the Croke Park agreement. In negotiating 
this extended agreement, the government is seeking to reduce its public service 
pay and pensions bill by a further €1 billion between 2013 and 2015. The options 
available to achieve this saving are relatively limited and, consequently, 
discussions are likely to centre on changes to existing work practices, public 
service numbers and levels of public sector pay.  
 
In relation to the earnings of public sector workers, a number of empirical studies 
have been carried out over the past decade (Boyle et al., 2004; Ernst & Young and 
Murphy, 2007; Kelly et al., 2009a and 2009b; Foley and O’Callaghan, 2010), all of 
which have reported a pay premium to public sector workers. However, there has 
been much debate regarding the magnitude of the gap. The most recent analysis 
was published by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in October 20121, using data 
for 2009 from the National Employment Survey (NES) and data for 2010 from 
combining the 2009 NES with administrative records from Revenue.  This analysis 
suggested that the public-private sector pay gap ranged between 6.1 per cent 
and 18.9 per cent in 2010. The report also showed that the premium fell between 
2009 and 2010, which is to be expected given the substantial public sector wage 
cuts implemented in 2010. The CSO report showed that, on average, public sector 
workers earned over 26 per cent more per week, and 40 per cent more per hour, 
than employees in the private sector in 2010. However, as the CSO report notes, 
much of this differential is due to differences between public and private sector 
workers in terms of education, experience and other factors that influence pay.  
Thus, while the average hourly pay of public sector workers might be 40 per cent 
higher, if half of this were attributable to superior experience and education 
levels of public sector workers, then the estimated public sector pay premium 
(i.e. the part that cannot be explained by differences in the characteristics of the 
workers) would be 20 per cent. Given this, it is crucial when attempting to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  Central Statistics Office, 2012. National Employment Survey 2009 and 2010 Supplementary Analysis. Cork: Central 
Statistics Office.  
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estimate the unexplained gap between public and private sector workers’ wages 
to ensure that the analysis is underpinned by assumptions that reflect the way 
pay is determined in each sector.  If the component of the pay gap related to 
characteristics is over/under-estimated, this will result in an under/over-estimate 
of the public-private pay gap by a similar amount.  
 
The recent extensive analysis of the public sector pay gap for 2010 by the CSO is 
important and welcome.2 In CSO (2012), the statisticians took an approach to 
estimating the wage gap that encompassed a very wide range of possible 
variables that might be included to explain the gap, thereby generating a wide 
range of estimates of the gap.  They did this on the basis that ‘any attempt to 
present a single, definitive, public-private pay differential would be subject and 
prone to over simplification’ (CSO, 2012, 3-4).3  
 
As labour market researchers, we take a different view to the CSO on this issue. 
We hold that, on the basis of the theoretical and empirical literature in this area, 
it is possible to choose between the different variables that might be included 
and the specifications that should be adopted. From our perspective, we believe 
firstly that the preferred specification is one where the only variable that should 
be used to measure organisation size is one that captures size at the 
establishment (plant) level. We believe that using the size variable measured at 
enterprise level, as is captured within the NES, is not appropriate and that 
including it has the impact of understating the wage gap.  Secondly, we believe 
that weighted regressions should be used to generate the estimates. The 
alternatives of using enterprise size and un-weighted regressions have a major 
impact on the size of the gap estimated. While presenting a very wide range of 
estimates, the CSO indicates that its preference is for a specification that includes 
enterprise as a wage determining characteristic, while acknowledging in the 
Report that there is no international agreement on this issue. 
 
To illustrate the impact of both enterprise size and the use of weights, Table 1 
replicates the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates from the 2012 CSO 
publication based on a sample of full-time permanent employees aged between 
25 and 59 years.4 It shows clearly the sensitivity of the measured gap to the 
assumptions made – including enterprise size leads to a halving of the estimated 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2  Issues in relation to the choice of variables arise in the case of all the CSO estimation techniques, e.g., i.e., the 
quantile regressions and the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.  
3 The methodology applied in the current report is similar to that in an earlier paper by CSO statisticians using NES 
2007 data. 
4  The issues involved in the estimation strategy used by the CSO were extensively debated previously at a meeting of 
the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland in November 2009. For more details, see Foley and O’Callaghan 
(2010). 
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differential and the used of un-weighted regressions has a smaller but significant 
impact on the gap .   
 
TABLE 1 Estimates of the Public-Private Pay Differential Taken from the CSO Supplementary Analysis5 
 
Model Specification Estimated Differential 
 Weighted Un-weighted 
Including Organisational Size 8.5 6.3 
Excluding Organisational Size 17.0 12.6 
 
Note:  The organisational size variable used here is at enterprise level.  
 
In the remainder of this note, we set out our reasons for holding that the 
organisational size at enterprise level should be omitted and that weighted 
regressions should be estimated.   
 
Organisational Size as an Explanatory Variable 
From the perspective of the labour market economics literature, there are a 
number of central arguments that seek to explain why larger firms pay more than 
smaller firms and, thus, form a basis for including organisational size in any 
models attempting to either explain or measure pay. First, larger firms tend to 
hire relatively more qualified and skilled workers as complements to their more 
capital intensive operations (Hamermesh, 1980). However, such differences in 
human capital attributes (e.g. educational attainment, experience, etc.) are fully 
captured in the models estimated in the CSO Supplementary Analysis, as the 
estimates  control for differences in both levels of educational attainment and 
labour market experience of employees between establishments6. Consequently, 
as such effects are explicitly measured within the estimated specifications it is not 
necessary to include an organisational size variable to proxy for such impacts7.  
 
A second prominent explanation for higher wages in larger firms relates to the 
efficiency wage theory, which argues that monitoring costs are higher in larger 
organisations and consequently large firms pay more in order to discourage 
shirking (Eaton and White, 1983; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). If the efficiency wage 
argument is to provide a theoretical basis for including an organisational size 
control, then the variable should reflect each organisation’s monitoring costs. 
However, the measurement of organisational size in the NES does not permit this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5  These estimates relate to all permanent full-time employees aged between 25 and 59, and are taken from Table C.3 
in the 2012 Supplementary Analysis. 
6  See page 24 of the Supplementary Analysis. 
7  We cannot deal with unobserved heterogeneity i.e., unobserved differences between public and private sector 
workers (e.g. motivation). However, sensitivity checks in Kelly et al. (2009b) suggests that unobserved heterogeneity 
is unlikely to be an important factor with regard to estimates of the public-private sector pay gap in Ireland. 
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to be done as it measures the number of employees at the enterprise rather than 
the establishment level. For example, in the NES 2006 data, the organisational 
size measure for each employee in the primary school sector was 34,084 because 
all employees in primary schools were recorded as having a single employer. 
Similarly, organisation size was measured as 17,168 in the secondary school 
sector; and 12,954 in the Garda. A similar issue arises in the case of some large 
private sector entities, e.g., banks and supermarkets.8  
 
However, the scale of these organisational size differences is not similar across 
the two sectors.  In fact, in the 2006 NES almost 95 per cent of public sector 
workers were measured as being employed in organisations of at least 500 
employees9, compared with just 24 per cent in the private sector. The importance 
of size as a factor is illustrated very clearly in the CSO estimates of the pay gap 
based on the 2007 NES (Foley and O’Callaghan, 2010), where employees in very 
large organisations were estimated to earn a premium of about 24 per cent 
compared to workers in small organisations.  Therefore, by including enterprise 
size, a substantial proportion of public sector pay is attributed to working in much 
larger organisations relative to the bulk of private sector employees.  The 
application of this organisational size premium in such a universal fashion gives 
rise to difficulties given that most schools, Garda stations, etc., do not in fact 
employ very large numbers of people. Moreover, while wage bargaining is 
undertaken at enterprise level, that variable is captured by the inclusion of the 
trade union membership. In the latest CSO report, we can see that the inclusion 
of the enterprise measure of organisational size leads to a reduction in the 
estimated pay gap by half, i.e., between 6.3 and 8.5 percentage points (Table 1).  
 
Furthermore, the theoretical literature has authoritatively argued  that only 
variables that can be treated as broadly fixed characteristics, such as, for 
example, educational qualifications, should be included in models attempting to 
measure the public-private pay differential (Gregory and Borland, 1999). 
However, the measurement approach used in the NES is such that the 
organisational size variable cannot be treated as a fixed characteristic that will 
remain unchanged should workers switch between sectors.   
 
Finally, the theoretical literature also suggests that pay may be higher in larger 
firms, reflecting higher profits generated by monopoly rents (Oswald, 1993; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8  We are grateful to the CSO for drawing this to our attention. 
9  This arises because, within the NES the organisational size variable is collected at the level of the enterprise as 
opposed to the establishment. The CSO make reference to the study of Boyle et al., (2004) with regards to an Irish 
study that incorporates a control for organisational size. However, as demonstrated in the vote of thanks to Foley and 
O’Callaghan (2010) it is clear that the data used within the Boyle et al., (2004) were collected at the level of the 
establishment. 
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Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Blanchflower et al., 1996). However, given that public 
sector organisations do not operate in a competitive products/services market, 
this rationale would seem to have little relevance to studies of the public-private 
sector pay differential. 
 
CSO (2012) presents estimates both with and without the enterprise size variable 
included. This demonstrates the important difference that including a size 
variable makes in the context of the analysis of the NES data. On the basis of the 
theoretical arguments above, we favour those estimates that exclude the 
enterprise size measure.    
 
The Weighting Decision 
It is also obvious from Table 1 that the size of the estimated public-private pay 
differential is heavily influenced by whether or not the data are weighted. Un-
weighted estimates lie between 4.4 and 2.2 percentage points below the 
comparable weighted estimates. In relation to its approach, the CSO states that 
there are numerous problems associated with the use of weights in regression 
models, while at the same time stating that “...greater emphasis is placed on 
weighted data” in reporting the pay gap results (CSO, 2012, p. 4). Nevertheless, in 
support of the decision to present un-weighted estimates, the CSO refers to three 
papers (Fazio et al., 2006; Gelman, 2007; and Winship and Radbill, 1994). These 
papers argue that it is sufficient to estimate un-weighted regressions provided 
that models include variables relevant to the weighting strategy as additional 
independent variables.  We agree that this is a perfectly legitimate argument 
under normal circumstances where the impact to be estimated relates specifically 
to the population that the sampling strategy attempts to replicate.   
 
However, with respect to the NES, the sampling stratification is designed to 
generate a data representation of the distribution of firms within the economy 
and not the distribution of employees.  Therefore, an un-weighted regression 
that includes key weighting variables (such as sector and organisational size) as 
additional controls will generate an acceptable estimate of the difference in pay 
between a worker in a representative private sector firm and his/her counterpart 
in a representative public sector organisation. However, as workers are not 
randomly distributed across firms and sectors, the un-weighted estimate will not 
relate to the difference in pay between representative private and public sector 
workers. This suggests that the literature cited in the Supplementary Analysis is 
not relevant in this context. The key conversion from a representative sample of 
firms to a representative sample of workers requires the data to be transformed 
in a manner not consistent with the initial survey design, which implies that the 
use of un-weighted data is not an appropriate option in such circumstances.   
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CSO (2012) contains estimates using both weighted and un-weighted data. This 
demonstrates clearly the difference that weighting makes to the estimates.  
Again, on the basis of the arguments above, our preference is for those estimates 
that are based on weighted data.   
 
Summary 
Given the importance of the current debate on public sector pay, we believe it is 
important to recognise the significance of the issues discussed in this Note. We 
suggest that, among the many estimates published in CSO (2012), greater 
emphasis should be placed on the results generated from equations containing 
the weighted estimates and excluding organisational size, since it cannot be 
measured at establishment level.10  On the basis of the above arguments, we 
hold the view that pay-gap estimates that are based on organisational size 
measured at enterprise level, or un-weighted data, are understating the extent of 
the wage gap. We believe that the data at hand require that estimates should be 
based on a specification that excludes organisational size as a control and that 
the data should be weighted to ensure that it is representative of the population 
of employees in employment. We note that the IMF has taken a similar view on 
this issue in its recent discussion of public sector pay levels in Ireland in the 
December 2012 country report11. Consequently, we are of the view that the 
average public-private pay gap in Ireland in 2010 was likely to have been close to 
17 per cent.  
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ESRI Research Note 2012/4/3 
 
The Regional Dimension of the 
Unemployment Crisis 
 
Edgar Morgenroth 
 
Introduction 
The economic crisis in Ireland has been subject to much commentary and 
different components of Ireland’s economic crisis have been analysed in a range 
of papers. For example the impact of the recession on foreign direct investment 
and exports has been investigated (Barry and Bergin, 2012, Godart et al 2011), 
job creation and destruction was analysed by Lawless (2012) and the labour 
market consequences of the crisis have been outline in Barrett and McGuinness 
(2012). However, one aspect that has not received much attention is the spatial 
dimension of the crisis. This is surprising as national averages tend to mask 
considerable heterogeneity across regions. Thus one would expect different parts 
of the country are likely to have been impacted in different ways1.  
 
One reason why there has been no systematic analysis of the regional dimension 
of the crisis is that data availability and particular availability of up to date data is 
more limited at the regional level. For example while Quarterly National Accounts 
are available for the third quarter of 2012, the most recent regional accounts are 
for 2009. Nevertheless up to date labour market data are available at the regional 
level from the Quarterly National Household Survey with the most recent 
publication referring to the third quarter of 20122. The Census 2011 also has 
some relatively up to date data on labour market variables at a very 
disaggregated spatial scale.  
 
This paper focuses on the regional dimension of the unemployment crisis. In 
particular it considers the evolution of the unemployment rate during the crisis 
and analyses the components that determine the change in the numbers 
unemployed. It also considers unemployment at the micro-spatial level.  
 
The Change in Regional Unemployment  
The national unemployment rate remained below 5 per cent for the period 
between the fourth quarter of 1999 and the fourth quarter of 2007. From that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  An exception is Morgenroth (2010) which outlined the broad impact of the crisis at the regional level up to 2009, but 
did not carry out the more detailed analysis provided in this paper. 
2  That release also revises the series in light of the Census 2011 results. 
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level it trebled in a very short period and has been relatively stable at about 15% 
for a number of quarters. The evolution of regional unemployment rates is shown 
in Figure 1, which broadly corresponds to the national trends. However the graph 
also shows some important differences across the regions. For example at the 
start of 1998 unemployment rates were still at over 10% in the Border and South-
East regions, while the West region had the lowest rate at 7.4%. All regions 
experienced a drop in unemployment rates and there was also convergence in 
unemployment rates across the regions during the boom, so that the difference 
between the regions reduced. However, the recession has not only resulted in a 
substantial rise in unemployment rates in all regions but has also led to 
divergence in unemployment rates across the regions (see Figure 1 and Table 1).  
 
In 2012 the highest unemployment rate is found in the South-East (19.4%) 
followed by the Border (17.7%) and Midlands (17.4%) regions. The Midlands and 
the South-East also experienced the most significant rise in the unemployment 
rate. The lowest rates are recorded for Dublin (12.9%), South-West (12.9%) and 
Mid East (13.8%) regions, which are economically stronger regions with higher 
levels of income and output. The three regions with the highest unemployment 
rates in 1998 also have the highest rates in 2012, indicating a strong persistence 
of the differences that is likely to be due to underlying structural factors. 
 
FIGURE 1 Regional Unemployment Rates 1998 to 2012 
 
 
Source:  CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
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In order to identify the impact of the crisis one needs to decide on a base period 
against which the current level of unemployment can be compared with. As 
employment peaked in the third quarter of 2007 in six out of eight regions this 
quarter is taken as the baseline quarter against which the impact of the recession 
is measured. Table 1 shows both the unemployment rate and the total number of 
unemployed persons in the third quarter of 2007 and 2012 respectively. While 
the unemployment rate more than trebled nationally between these points, 
there is considerable heterogeneity across regions. For example the 
unemployment rate in the Midlands region is now 4.7 times that seen in 2007. On 
the other hand Dublin and the Mid-West experienced less than a trebling in 
unemployment rates. The absolute changes are also very striking with almost 
325,000 people classified as unemployed compared to just under 108,000 in 
2007. In the Midlands region the number of unemployed was as low as 4,900 in 
2007 but now stands at 17,300. Since the crisis started the gap between the 
highest and lowest unemployment rate has increased significantly from 2 per 
cent to 7 per cent. 
 
TABLE 1 Unemployment Rate and Absolute Number of Unemployed for Q3 2007 and Q3 2012 
 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Q3 2007 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Q3 2012 
Number of 
Unemployed 
Q3 2007 
(000s) 
Number of 
Unemployed 
Q3 2012 
(000s) 
Change in 
Unemployment 
(000s) 
% %    
Border 6.0 17.7 14.1 37.2 23.1 
Midlands 3.7 17.4 4.9 22.2 17.3 
West 4.7 15.3 10.3 32.8 22.5 
Dublin 4.7 12.9 31.7 81.3 49.6 
Mid-East 3.9 13.8 10.5 35.9 25.4 
Mid-West 5.7 16.6 10.4 30 19.6 
South-East 5.3 19.4 12.5 44.3 31.8 
South-West 3.9 12.9 12.9 40.8 27.9 
State 4.7 
 
15.0 107.5 
 
324.5 
 
217.2 
 
Source:  CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
Components of Unemployment Change 
The unemployment rate is a function of the number of persons in employment 
and the size of the labour force3. Changes in unemployment are thus due to 
changes in employment and the labour force, which are shown in Table 2. The 
first column of Table 2 shows the change in the numbers unemployed, the 
second shows the change in the numbers employed and the third column shows 
the change in the size of the labour force. Subtracting the change in employment 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Number Unemployed = Labour Force – Number Employed 
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from the change in the labour force yields the change in unemployment4. Overall 
the Border region suffered the most significant decline in employment (-22 per 
cent), followed by the South East (-19 per cent) and the Midlands (-18 per cent). 
Employment contracted by between 12 per cent and 14 per cent in the other 
regions, with the West region faring best.  
 
While the Border region suffered the most dramatic employment contraction it 
also experienced the most significant contraction in the labour force (-11 per 
cent) which significantly dampened the increase in the numbers unemployed. For 
both the Border and Dublin the reduction in the labour force accounted for close 
to half the decline in employment. In contrast, the labour force hardly changed in 
the West region. 
 
The labour force is a function of the number of persons of working age (here 
taken to be the population aged over 15 years) and the labour force participation 
rate in the labour force, and therefore changes in the labour force are a function 
of changes in these two variables, which are also shown in Table 25. Most striking 
is the very significant decrease in the participation rate in the Border region (-13 
per cent) and to a lesser extent in the Midlands (-9 per cent) and Mid-East (-8 per 
cent) regions. Also striking is the strong growth of the population aged 15 and 
over in the Midlands (6 per cent) and the Mid-East (5 per cent). Overall, while the 
population increased, participation rates have fallen so that these two 
components have opposite effects on unemployment i.e. the increase in the 
population has increased unemployment while the reduction in participation 
rates has decreased unemployment.  
 
Given the multiplicative relationship between these two factors calculating the 
contributions of each to unemployment requires a slightly more difficult 
decomposition6. The results of the total decomposition are shown in Figure 2 
which shows the contribution of changes in employment, population and 
participation rate to total unemployment. It should be noted that the change in 
population is shown as a negative impact as it has the effect to increase the 
unemployment rate. The graph shows that the drop in employment was made 
the largest contribution to the increase in unemployment in all regions. It also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4  Formally ∆𝑈 = ∆𝐿𝐹 − ∆𝐸 where ∆ denotes the change in the variable and U, LF and E denote unemployment, the 
labour force and employment respectively. For the Border region the calculation is -26.4 - (-49.5) = -26.4 + 49.5 = 
23.1. 
5  Labour Force = Working Age Population x Labour Force Participation Rate. 
6        ∆𝐿𝐹 = 𝑃𝑅0 ∗ ∆𝑃𝑜𝑝 − ∆𝑃𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝0 + ∆𝑃𝑅 ∗ ∆𝑃𝑜𝑝, where ∆ refers to a change, Pop refers to the population, PR to 
the participation rate and the subscript 0 refer the starting point Q3 2007. The first term yields the pure population 
effect, the second term gives the pure participation effect and the third term represents a second order interaction 
effect which is found to impact only marginally on unemployment (see Fuchs et al, 2008).  
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clearly shows the significant heterogeneity across regions regarding all 
components.  
 
TABLE 2 Components of the Unemployment Change between Q3 2007 and Q3 2012 
 
 
Change in 
Unemployment 
(000s) 
Change in 
Employment 
(000s) 
Change in the 
Labour Force 
(000s) 
Change in the 
Population 
(aged over 15) 
(000s) 
Change in 
Participation 
Rate 
(%) 
Border 23.1 (164%) -49.5 (-22%) -26.4 (-11%) 10.1 (3%) -13% 
Midlands 17.3 (353%) -22.4 (-18%) -5.0 (-4%) 13.0 (6%) -9% 
West 22.5 (218%) -25.3 (-12%) -2.8 (-1%) 2.6 (1%) -2% 
Dublin 49.6 (156%) -92.1 (-14%) -42.5 (-6%) -1.5 (0%) -6% 
Mid-East 25.4 (242%) -32.1 (-13%) -6.7 (-3%) 21.2 (5%) -8% 
Mid-West 19.6 (188%) -22.5 (-13%) -2.9 (-2%) 5.4 (2%)  -3% 
South-East 31.8 (254%) -42.1 (-19%) -10.3 (-4%) 12.2 (3%) -7% 
South-West 27.9 (216%) -42.5 (-13%) -14.7 (-4%) 12.5 (2%) -7% 
State 217.2 (202%) -328.5 (-15%) -111.3 (-5%) 75.6 (2%) -7% 
 
Source:  CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
FIGURE 2  Components of the Unemployment Change between Q3 2007 and Q3 2012 
 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations. The second order effects are very small and therefore barely noticeable. They are included here for 
 completeness. 
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demographic and participation changes had not occurred7. This calculation is 
easily done by dividing the numbers unemployed in 2012 by the labour force of 
2007, which is shown in Figure 3 below. This shows that in the Border region in 
particular, the drop in participation rate of 13.5 per cent significantly dampened 
the rise in the unemployment rate, which could otherwise have reached 27 per 
cent. Dublin would also have experienced a significantly higher unemployment 
rate of 18 per cent instead of 13 per cent. However in the West the difference 
would have been quite modest (1 per cent) as the participation rate declined only 
slightly, as shown in Table 2.  
 
FIGURE 3 Actual and Hypothetical Unemployment Rate holding the Population and Participation at 2007 
Levels 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations and CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
Employment Change 
In the decomposition above total employment change was considered. However, 
it is well known that there are substantial differences in the sectoral composition 
of employment across regions (see Morgenroth 2009). Dublin in particular differs 
from the rest of the country in that it has a higher concentration of employment 
in services and particularly public services, which is shown in Figure 4 for 2007 
and 2012. Dublin has a lower employment share in Agriculture, Industry and 
Construction and a higher share in Health and Social Work, Public Administration 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 The impact of migration could not be considered here as regional migration figures for the period considered are not 
available. 
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and Defence, Financial Services Insurance and Real Estate, Professional, scientific 
and technical services. A sharp reduction in the share of employment accounted 
for by the construction sector can be seen in Figure 4, for both Dublin and outside 
of Dublin. Also notable is the fact that Health and Social Work and Public 
Administration increased their share of employment, reflecting the fact that both 
are largely public sector activities. Interestingly, the share of employment in 
industry in Dublin declined significantly during the crisis, while in the rest of the 
country this share remained almost unchanged. 
 
FIGURE 4 Sectoral Employment Shares in Dublin and the Rest of the Country Q3 2007 to Q3 2012 
 
 
 
Source :  CSO Quarterly National Household Survey8.  
 
While Figure 4 clearly shows the differences in industrial structure, it is more 
difficult to identify the changes in employment by sector, which is more readily 
achieved in tabular form (see Table 3). Sectors that grew in all or all but one 
regions include Information and Communications, Education, and Health and 
Social Work. Other sectors declined but the level of change varies considerably 
across regions. The table clearly shows that employment in industry declined 
particularly strongly in the Dublin region. The accommodation and food services 
sector contracted particularly strongly in the Border and Midlands regions.  
Professional, scientific and technical sector employment declined by more than 
two fifth in the Midlands region. The West region benefitted from a 25 per cent 
increase in employment in education which constitutes 5 times the national 
average. The table shows that construction employment contracted by 63 per 
cent nationally, with a regional range between 69 per cent (West) and 55 per 
cent (Mid-East). Overall the change in construction employment is more uniform 
than the change in employment in any other sector, which suggests that the 
heterogeneity in the change in total employment is largely driven by changes in 
other sectors.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8  AgForFish refers to Agriculture, forestry and fishing, WholesRetail refers to Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles TranspStor refers to Transportation and storage, AccomFood refers to Accommodation and food service activities, 
InfoCom refers to Information and communication, FinInsReal refers to Financial, insurance and real estate activities, ProfScienTech 
refers to Professional, scientific and technical activities, AdminSup refers to Administrative and support service activities, 
PubAdminDef  refers to Public administration and defence; compulsory social security, HealthSocW refers to Human health and 
social work activities and Other refers to Other NACE activities 
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TABLE 3 Employment Change by Sector and Region between Q3 2007 and Q3 2012 
 
Sector Border Midlands West Dublin 
Mid-
East 
Mid-
West 
South-
East 
South-
West State 
 
% % % % % % % % % 
Agriculture,  
forestry  
and fishing -14 -23 -30 0 -27 -22 -18 -36 -24 
Industry -33 -18 -8 -41 -26 -26 -17 -14 -25 
Construction -63 -68 -69 -67 -55 -57 -66 -57 -63 
Wholesale, retail 
trade;  
repair of motor 
vehicles and  
motorcycles -17 5 -10 -17 -10 -15 -19 -3 -12 
Transportation  
and storage  16 -4 27 -6 -4 -1 -16 -6 -3 
Accommodation  
and food service  -30 -25 -17 -12 -10 7 -1 -4 -11 
Information and  
Communication -33 32 58 2 78 52 20 9 16 
Financial, insurance  
and real estate 0 -20 15 -7 3 38 -12 -12 -4 
Professional,  
Scientific, technical 
activities -16 -43 -5 -9 -10 -8 -16 -22 -13 
Administrative and 
support services -34 0 -9 -26 -21 -31 -2 -12 -20 
Public administration,  
defence; social  
security -13 -14 -12 -10 -3 14 -10 -3 -8 
Education -1 7 25 4 3 5 2 1 5 
Human health,  
social work  1 17 10 16 10 11 5 20 12 
Other NACE  -8 -2 19 15 0 5 -4 -7 4 
Not stated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -46 
Total -22 -18 -12 -14 -12 -13 -18 -13 -15 
 
Source:  CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
 
Given the considerable difference in economic geography between the regions 
and the very different growth performance of individual sectors, it is useful to 
consider how these compositional differences have impacted on employment 
change. Shift-share analysis has a long tradition as a method of analysis for this 
purpose.  
 
Shift-share analysis decomposes the change in employment into a national 
component, an industry component and a regional component (Thirlwall, 1967, 
Jones, 2012). The national component identifies the change in employment had 
the national rate of change applied in the region, the industry component 
identifies the change in employment that is due to the employment trends in 
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each industry and the regional component measures employment change that is 
due to region specific factors. 
 
The results of the shift-share analysis are shown in Figure 5 below. The most 
notable feature is that Dublin benefitted from the industrial mix present, while 
suffering more than other regions from the national trend which is not surprising 
given that Dublin significantly contributes to the overall national trend. Also 
notable is that the West, Mid-East, Mid-West and South-West had a positive 
regional component which implies that aspects specific to these regions had a 
positive impact on employment while such region specific factors had a negative 
impact on employment on the remaining regions. Overall the analysis suggests 
that the national trend contributed most to employment change in all regions. 
The region specific factors were also very important in all regions except the 
Midlands and the South-East. 
 
FIGURE 5  Shift-Share Components of Employment Change by Region Q3 2007 to Q3 2012 
 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations based on QNHS data. 
 
Micro-spatial Analysis 
The analysis above has shown that there is significant heterogeneity across 
regions with respect to the unemployment rate and its underlying components. 
Such heterogeneity tends to be greater within regions than between regions and 
it is therefore also useful to consider unemployment at the micro-spatial level. 
This is possible using data from the CSO Census of Population, which provides 
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data for electoral districts as part of the Small Area Population Statistics (SAPS), 
which is available for census years9. Electoral districts are the smallest 
administrative units in Ireland. The SAPS gives details for just over 3,400 electoral 
divisions and they range in area from 5 hectares to just under 13,000 hectares 
and in population from 73 persons to just over 36,000 persons. Map 1 shows the 
deviation of the unemployment rate in each Electoral Division from the national 
average. An interesting spatial pattern can be observed, in that the hinterlands of 
Dublin, Cork and Galway and to a lesser extent Limerick, Sligo and Athlone have 
lower than average unemployment.  Some of the most peripheral areas of 
Donegal, Galway and Mayo have substantially higher unemployment rates than 
the national average, but this is also the case in some urban areas in particular in 
Dublin, Cork and Waterford.  
 
It is possible to consider some of the underlying drivers of the heterogeneity. The 
spatial pattern of the unemployment is highly persistent, as the correlation of 
unemployment rates between 2006 and 2011 is 0.67. However, the correlation 
between the unemployment rate in 2011 and 1991 is even higher at 0.74. The 
map gives an impression that more peripheral regions in general experience 
higher unemployment, and this is confirmed by the correlation between the 
unemployment rate and  the average distance from an ED to all other EDs which 
is a measure of peripherality which is positive (0.13). However, the correlation 
between the unemployment rate and the agriculture share of employment which 
is a measure of the rurality of an ED is negative (-0.25). This may be due to some 
absorption of unemployed workers back into agricultural activities. Also 
interesting is that ED with a higher population density have a higher 
unemployment rate (correlation coefficient of 0.18). This basic analysis suggests 
that the differences are not simply reflecting an urban rural divide but are due to 
persistent underlying factors that have not been altered by the boom.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9  In Ireland a full census is taken every 5 years and the most recent census was taken in 2011. 
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MAP 1  Deviation of the Local Unemployment Rate from the National Average 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  CSO Census of Population, Small Area Population Statistics (SAPS). 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has considered the regional dimension of the unemployment crisis. 
The analysis shows significant heterogeneity across regions. The unemployment 
rate in the region with the highest rate is 6.5 per cent higher than in the region 
with the lowest rate.  Thus, national level statistics hide the fact that there are 
areas with considerably higher unemployment rates than the average and other 
with considerably lower rates. 
 
A contraction in the labour force dampened the increase in the numbers 
unemployed, particularly in the Border and Dublin regions. In the Border region 
the unemployment rate would have reached 27 per cent if there had not been a 
very significant drop in the participation rate. As is well known, there are 
significant differences regarding the industrial specialisation across regions, with 
Dublin in particular having a very different industrial structure than the rest of the 
country. In addition the regions have been subject to differences in employment 
changes by sector. Nevertheless, national trends are responsible for significant 
proportion of the employment change, but regional factors also play a role. The 
analysis at the micro-spatial level shows that the heterogeneity at this level is 
significantly larger than even at the regional level. 
 
The persistence of unemployment differentials suggests that there are underlying 
structural differences across regions. From a policy perspective this is important 
as national policies are unlikely to address these region and location specific 
factors. Indeed the persistence of the patterns suggests that past policies were 
ineffective at dealing with these structural differences.  
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Trends in Consumption since the Crisis: 
Ireland in Context 
 
Brian O’Connell, Conor O’Toole and Nuša Žnuderl 
 
Introduction 
Household consumption is the single largest component of GDP: it represented 
nearly 60 per cent of GDP in euro area economies on average over the period 
2000 to 2012.1 Therefore, in light of the contraction in GDP experienced during 
the crisis in many European countries, movements in consumption represent a 
key economic indicator and it is important to understand their determinants. This 
note examines these movements in both the non-crisis countries (Germany, 
France, Austria, Netherlands, Finland) and the crisis countries (Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain) of Europe during the ongoing financial upheaval. It then 
provides an analysis of the main drivers of these changes, before finally 
comparing the path of consumption in Ireland to some historical examples. 
 
FIGURE 1 Real Per-Capita Consumption in the Non-crisis Countries and Ireland (Relative to 2000 Levels) 
 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from the OECD, Eurostat, National Accounts, the IMF and the United Nations.  
Note:  Data obtained from international sources may not be entirely consistent with data from national sources. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  Source: Eurostat. 
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Trends in Consumption since the Crisis  
As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the beginning of the last decade saw a positive 
trend in real private per capita consumption2 across Europe. The almost universal 
growth in consumption in the early years of the decade was part of “the great 
moderation” period as articulated by Bernanke (2004) and the “NICE” (Non-
Inflationary, Consistently Expansionary) period described by King (2003), which 
brought consistent growth across the developed world during the 1990s and early 
2000s. However, the divergence in the path of consumption between the non-
crisis and crisis nations after the onset of the financial crisis is stark. This analysis 
attempts to place Ireland’s per capita consumption in context with its peers in the 
non-crisis and crisis economies of Europe.  
 
Consumption in the Non-Crisis Economies  
The non-crisis nations, while generally believed to have weathered the crisis well, 
nevertheless experienced declines in consumption of varying degrees during the 
period from late 2007-2008. Germany was first to record a small decline in 
consumption in 2007 Q1. The path of consumption amongst the non-crisis nations 
is illustrated in Figure 1, with Ireland’s consumption included for contrast. All the 
non-crisis nations suffered a dip of some sort in their levels of per capita 
consumption. However, for the most part, the core nations have seen 
consumption level out after their dips and have returned to growth, though at a 
lower trajectory than pre-crisis. The Netherlands is the only non-crisis nation with 
per-capita consumption at less than 2000 levels as of 2012 Q2.  
 
Consumption in the Crisis Countries 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the crisis nations have experienced much larger falls 
than any of the non-crisis nations. Additionally, as of 2012 Q2, they have also 
failed to demonstrate the flattening out of consumption levels or the return to 
growth seen in the non-crisis nations. The onset of the decline in Ireland’s per-
capita consumption coincides with the beginning of both Italy and Spain’s fall but 
comes slightly sooner than the slumps in Greece and Portugal. Ireland, Italy and 
Portugal have all seen falls in per capita consumption to levels below those 
experienced in 2000. Data for Greece is only available to 2011 Q1, but given 
developments since then and the previous trajectory of Greek consumption, it is 
reasonable to expect that Greece too is now close, if not already below, 2000 
levels of personal consumption.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2  Defined as: total final consumption expenditure data from the OECD, put into real terms using inflation data from the 
IMF and given in per capita terms by dividing by population figures from the United Nations. 
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FIGURE 2 Real Per-Capita Consumption in the Crisis Countries (Relative to 2000 levels) 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from the OECD, Eurostat, National Accounts, the IMF and the United Nations. 
Note:  Data obtained from international sources may not be entirely consistent with data from national sources. 
 
While the non-crisis nations are generally seeing recovery in per-capita 
consumption in recent quarters, the position is much more strained in the crisis 
nations. In these economies, the general level of uncertainty and weakness in the 
household sector does not appear conducive to a sustained recovery in 
consumption.  
 
Consumption in Ireland in Context 
Ireland’s private consumption began its slide in mid-2007, but dramatic declines 
began only in 2008 Q1. Ireland’s decline in consumption was beyond anything 
experienced in the non-crisis nations and was also the most rapid of the crisis 
nations, with Ireland being the first country to fall below 2000 levels of personal 
consumption in mid-2011. 
 
As well as this, Figure 3 shows that Ireland had the largest fall in personal 
consumption from peak to trough of 21.2 per cent. However, it is not 
inconceivable that Greece, having already experienced an 11 per cent fall by early 
2011 and given its economic performance in the last year, may have overtaken 
Ireland’s total decline in consumption. Additionally, Figure 3 shows a remarkable 
symmetry across the crisis nations between the pre-crisis gains and post-crisis 
losses in consumption that only Greece has yet to demonstrate. 
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FIGURE 3 Pre-Crisis Gains in Per-Capita Consumption since 2000 and Post-Crisis Declines from Peak  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from the OECD, Eurostat, National Accounts, the IMF and the United Nations. 
 
In the context of the non-crisis nations, Finland is perhaps the starkest contrast to 
Ireland given their similar pre-crisis trajectory of per-capita consumption growth, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. Per-capita consumption in Finland fell from a pre-crisis 
peak of 125 per cent of 2000 levels to a trough of 119 per cent in mid-2009 but 
has since returned to around 128 per cent of 2000 consumption as of mid-2012. 
By contrast, per-capita consumption in Ireland has fallen to 96 per cent of 2000 
levels as of 2012 Q2. These contrasting declines in consumption in the crisis are 
demonstrated in Figure 3.  
 
The fall in personal per-capita consumption in Ireland during the crisis has thus far 
outstripped anything seen amongst the non-crisis nations of Europe and has, 
given available data, constituted the largest and fastest fall amongst the crisis 
nations. In fact, historically, the consumption collapse in Ireland is comparable to 
that experienced by the United States during the Great Depression, when 
personal consumption expenditure fell by 27.2 per cent3 between 1929 and 1933.  
 
Drivers of Consumption Changes since the Onset of the Financial Crisis 
In this section we attempt to explain changes in aggregate household 
consumption since the onset of the financial crisis by considering trends in three 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3  Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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key variables: income, wealth and credit. In particular, for the set of non-crisis and 
crisis European economies used in the previous section, we relate the changes in 
real household consumption per-capita between 2008 Q1 and 2011 Q44 to 
changes over the same time period in real per-capita personal disposable income, 
changes in household wealth as measured by changes in real house prices and 
changes in credit availability.  
 
FIGURE 4  Change in Real Consumption Per-Capita and Real Personal Disposable Income Per-Capita 
between 2008 Q1 and 2011 Q4 in Non-Crisis and Crisis Economies 
 
 
NOTE:  
ΔC – Change in real household consumption per-capita over the period 2008 Q1 and 2011 Q4, except for 
Greece where the change in real household consumption per-capita is measured over the period 2008 Q1 to 
2011 Q1 because of data availability issues. 
ΔY – Change in real personal disposable income per-capita over the period 2008 Q1 and 2011 Q4, except for 
Greece where the change in real personal disposable income is measured over the period 2008 Q1 to 2011 Q1 
because of data availability issues. 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from the OECD, Eurostat, National Accounts, the IMF and the United Nations. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4  The period 2008 Q1 to 2011 Q4, with respect to which changes in consumption, income and house prices were 
calculated for the purposes of this section, excludes observations for 2012. This is because data for 2012 was 
available only for a select number of countries, while for each country in the sample we want to analyse changes in 
these variables over the same time period. The exception is Greece, where due to data availability issues we examine 
the relationship between changes in consumption, income and housing wealth over the period 2008Q1 to 2011 Q1. A 
longer time period was considered when describing trends in consumption in the previous section, and therefore the 
quoted changes in variables in this section might not be identical to those quoted in the previous section.  
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The Relationship between Consumption and Income 
The relationship between changes in real personal disposable income per-capita 
and changes in real consumption per-capita for the set of non-crisis and crisis 
economies since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 until 2011 Q45 is shown in 
Figure 4. Generally, this relationship is positive: declines in real personal 
disposable income per-capita are associated with declines in real consumption 
per-capita.  
 
This positive relationship could have occurred because consumers revised income 
expectations downwards, faced credit constraints, which prevented them from 
offsetting the decline in income through borrowing, experienced an increase in 
personal taxes and/or engaged in increased precautionary savings in the face of 
an uncertain economic outlook and in anticipation of increased future tax bills. 
Moreover, consumption of those who rely on state transfers is also held back due 
to reductions in social spending. Such an increased tax burden and lower state 
transfers have been common features across both sets of countries examined in 
this note. However it is not surprising that declines in income and consumption 
per capita were larger in crisis economies, given the greater severity of the 
financial crisis.  
 
Compared to other economies in the sample, data suggest that over the period 
2008 Q1 to 2011 Q4 Ireland experienced the largest decline in both real personal 
disposable income (-23 per cent) and real consumption per capita (-18 per cent).  
 
Consumption and Household Wealth 
Household wealth consists of financial assets and housing assets. Because real-
estate prices played a major role in the domestic crises in several of the worst 
affected economies, in this section we omit financial wealth and analyse the 
relationship between changes in consumption and changes in housing wealth 
since the onset of the crisis. 
 
We use changes in real house prices over the period 2008Q1 to 2011Q4 as an 
indicator of changes in housing wealth of households. We plot these changes in 
house prices against changes in household consumption per-capita in Figure 5. 
The relationship between changes in consumption and housing wealth is positive: 
declines in housing wealth since the recession were associated with declines in 
consumption. This positive relationship could be interpreted as consumers 
recognising the previous expansion in housing wealth as being the result of a 
bubble and thus unlikely to be regained in the near future. Consumers thus may 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5  For Greece the data on consumption and income were only available until 2011 Q1. Consequently, for Greece the 
relationship between these variables is examined with respect to changes over the period 2008 Q1 to 2011 Q1. 
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be expecting the decline in housing wealth to be permanent and are adjusting 
their consumption accordingly.  
 
FIGURE 5  Changes in Real Consumption Per-Capita and Real House Prices between 2008 Q1 and 2011 Q4 
in Non-crisis and Crisis Economies 
 
 
NOTE:  
ΔC – Change in real household consumption per-capita over the period 2008Q1 and 2011Q4, except for Greece 
where the change in real household consumption per-capita is measured over the period 2008Q1 to 2011Q1 
because of data availability issues 
ΔPH– Change in real house prices over the period 2008Q1 and 2011Q4, except for Greece where the change in 
real house prices is measured over the period 2008Q1 to 2011Q1 because of data availability issues
Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from the OECD, Eurostat, National Accounts, the IMF, the United Nation, BIS, and CSO. 
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period. The next largest declines in housing wealth occurred in Greece (-20 per 
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declines in consumption of 11 per cent in Greece and Spain, and a 5 per cent 
decline in consumption in Italy. 
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positive relationship: a modest decline in house prices (-1 per cent) was 
associated with an increase in consumption of 3 per cent. However, over the 
same period of time Germany experienced an increase in income of 1 per cent, 
Greece 
Italy 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Austria 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
-20% 
-15% 
-10% 
-5% 
0% 
5% 
-50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 
ΔC 
ΔPH 
82  |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  C omme nt ary  –  Wi nt er  20 12  
 
which could have potentially overpowered the negative impact of the decline in 
housing wealth, thereby resulting in an increase in consumption over the period. 
 
The Role of Credit in Consumption 
In the previous sections we considered two major drivers of consumption: income 
and wealth. However, there certainly exist other factors which have affected 
consumption since the onset of the financial crisis, such as the supply of credit. 
 
FIGURE 6  Change in Real Consumption Per Capita and Credit Levels between 2008 Q1 and 2011 Q4 in Non-
crisis and Crisis Economies 
 
 
NOTE:  
ΔC – Change in real household consumption per capita over the period 2008 Q1 and 2011 Q4, except for 
Greece where the change in real household consumption per capita is measured over the period 2008Q1 to 
2011Q1 because of data availability issues. 
ΔCr – Change in the supply of private credit over the period 2008 Q1 and 2012 Q1, except for Greece where 
the change in the supply of private credit is measured over the period 2008 Q1 to 2011 Q1 because of data 
availability issues.
Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from the OECD, Eurostat, National Accounts, the IMF, the United Nation, BIS, and CSO. 
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considered.6 While a full evaluation of the contribution of credit to the evolution 
of European economies is outside the scope of this note, these trends raise a 
number of concerns.  
 
First, given the scale of the banking sector difficulties in Ireland, Spain and other 
crisis economies, households may find it increasingly difficult to access new credit 
to engage in consumption smoothing and continue to purchase goods and 
services in the face of temporary income reductions. If such credit constraints 
exist, this may act as a drag on consumption until such time as financial markets 
return to normality. 
 
Figure 6 demonstrates a positive relationship between credit and consumption 
growth. This relationship suggests that the decreases in credit in Ireland, Spain 
and Portugal since 2009 could be restraining consumption expenditure.    
 
The second concern relates to the stock of outstanding credit. The level of 
household indebtedness can influence consumption. More highly indebted 
households tend to restrict consumption more than less heavily indebted 
households (Dynan, 2012). Given the very considerable increase in household 
debt in the pre-crisis period in Ireland, the requirement for balance sheet repair 
will force households to continue to allocate significant resources to cover debt 
servicing costs and the repayment of principle. Reducing household debt balances 
may be necessary from a financial stability and long-term sustainability 
perspective but it may also dampen and slow any recovery in consumption.  
 
Consumption Recoveries Following Financial Crises 
Having provided a comparative perspective of the trends in, and determinants of, 
consumption expenditure since the crisis, it is useful to benchmark Ireland’s 
experience relative to other countries which have suffered financial crises. In this 
section, we compare Ireland to four specific crisis episodes: Finland (1993-1995), 
Norway (1986-1988), Korea (1997-1998), and Japan (1995-1997).7 Our 
comparison focuses on three indicators: i) the peak to trough fall in consumption 
in crisis periods, ii) the number of quarters taken to reach the crisis trough and iii), 
the number of quarters taken to recover to the pre-crisis peak.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6  Source: Authors’ calculations using data from BIS, the IMF, the United Nations, and CSO. 
7  Crisis episodes are taken as systemic banking crises with the timing and definition given by Laeven and Valencia 
(2012). These country-episodes were chosen because the crises suffered in these economies were precipitated by a 
domestic credit bubble and subsequent bank failures. While it would have been also interesting to evaluate the crisis 
in Sweden in the early 90s (as in Woods and O’Connell (2012)), our dataset uses quarterly data and no official 
Quarterly National Accounts are available for Sweden prior to 1993 Q1, which is the midpoint of their crisis. For this 
reason, we do not include Sweden. 
84  |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  C omme nt ary  –  Wi nt er  20 12  
 
Figure 7 outlines the first two indicators. To date, per-capita consumption in 
Ireland has fallen by approximately 20% from its peak. With the peak to trough 
fall amounting to 10% in Finland, 6% in Norway and 17% in Korea, the scale of the 
fall in consumption in Ireland is greater than any of the crisis episodes considered. 
In terms of the number of quarters taken to reach the trough, the decline in 
consumption to date in Ireland has lasted 18 quarters. The closest comparator 
considered is Finland, where it took 12 quarters to reach the trough, with all other 
crises being considerably shorter. This highlights the protracted and engrained 
nature of the fall in consumption in the Irish economy. 
 
FIGURE 7  Peak to Trough Declines in Consumption with Time Taken to Reach Trough
 
Source:  Authors analysis of National Accounts, IMF and OECD data. 
 
To inform the debate concerning potential recovery paths for consumption in 
Ireland, it is useful to review the time taken to recover to the pre-crisis peak in the 
selected comparison episodes. Figure 8 presents timelines for the recovery path 
of consumption to pre-crisis peak values. Korea experienced the quickest recovery 
with only 10 quarters passing before the pre-crisis peak was achieved. Finland and 
Norway shared similar recovery paths at 27 and 31 quarters respectively. With the 
expiry of 19 quarters since the peak in consumption in Ireland, and given the scale 
of the peak to trough decline, the time to recovery could be expected to exceed 
those experienced by other countries.   
 
This brief comparison finds that the scale of the decline in consumption in Ireland 
since the onset of the financial crisis is much greater than that experienced in 
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continued buoyancy and growth in the international economy, as well as a more 
flexible monetary and exchange rate policy environment. The challenging external 
context faced by Ireland could go some way to explaining why the length and 
depth of the Irish crisis stands out from previous episodes. 
 
FIGURE 8  Timeline Indices of Recovery to Pre Crisis Peak
 
 
Source: Authors analysis of National Accounts, IMF and OECD data. 
 
Conclusion  
This note has illustrated the diverging paths of real per capita consumption across 
the non-crisis and crisis nations of Europe in the wake of the financial crisis. The 
non-crisis nations saw relatively small falls in consumption at the outset of the 
crisis but have almost universally returned to growth. The crisis nations, however, 
have seen much more dramatic collapses in real per-capita consumption levels 
with no evidence of a return to growth. Ireland has experienced the largest and 
fasted decline in consumption to date. 
 
This illustration of consumption trends was then followed by examination of the 
determinants of consumption: income and wealth, as well as a brief examination 
of credit. The crisis nations have all experienced larger falls in real per capita 
income than the non-crisis nations, with Ireland again experiencing the largest 
decline. As expected, during a financial crisis when credit constraints bind and 
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house prices, where the trend again is for crisis nations to have experienced larger 
declines than the non-crisis.   
 
Finally, the note examined the performance of Ireland relative to historical 
examples of financial crises. Ireland’s experience stands out as constituting a 
larger decline in consumption and a longer recovery period than is the historical 
norm. 
 
The findings of this research serve to highlight the severity of the economic 
contraction experienced by Ireland in the context of other European economies. 
To date, we have observed that Ireland has experienced the largest and fastest 
falls in real per capita consumption, real per capita income and housing wealth. 
 
Looking ahead, recent data suggest that house prices are ceasing to fall, the 
unemployment rate is stabilising and Ireland is projected to experience stronger 
growth than the other crisis nations by the European Commission (2012). 
However, given the continued difficulties in the domestic economy, the strained 
and uncertain European and global outlooks, and the requirement for household 
balance sheet repair in Ireland, growth in per capita consumption is likely to 
remain weak. 
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  ESRI Research Bulletin 2012/4/5 
Revisions to Population, Migration and the 
Labour Force, 2007-2011 
 
Kevin Timoney 
 
Census 2011 has led to substantial revisions to the inter-censal population 
estimates published by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). These revisions are 
attributed mainly to the underestimation of migration flows for the years 2007-
2011; data from the previous Census from 2006 were not revised. Adjusted 
natural increases for the period (based on vital statistics) accounted for the 
remaining differences between revisions to annual population and cumulative 
migration. Figure 1 shows the annual population underestimations for 2007-
2011, mainly comprising cumulative net migration. In total, the April 2011 
population was revised upwards in Census 2011 by 90,600. 
 
FIGURE 1 Underestimates of Population and (Cumulative) Net Migration, 2007-2011
 
Sources:  CSO (2011, 2012a). 
 
Revisions to immigration 
While there were revisions to both outward and inward migration levels, the 
change was more dramatic for immigration. In particular for the period 2007-
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higher than previously estimated. Changes to the methodology for inter-censal 
estimation of immigration are documented by the CSO (2012a), whereby the 
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) data were complemented with 
population-wide statistical databases, such as Personal Public Service (PPS) 
numbers and social welfare records. The technique for estimating emigration was 
also updated to account for the number of work permits issued, and the amount 
of UK National Insurance numbers issued to Irish nationals. 
 
Closer examination of the revised gross migration flows reveals the 
unprecedented volume of inward migration seen during the early inter-censal 
years. Table 1 reveals the nationality of these immigrants as mainly “EU-12” 
(member states joining the EU since May 2004), and returning Irish nationals. 
Immigration was previously underestimated for 2007-2011 by 65,800 for EU-12 
citizens, and 30,000 for Irish nationals. Gross immigration of Irish, EU-12 and all 
other nationalities are also shown. Since 2009, returning Irish nationals have 
outnumbered immigrants from EU-12 countries. 
 
TABLE 1 Immigration, Revisions and Gross Data by Origin, 2007-2011
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 2007-2011 
 Revisions to Immigration by Origin, 000s 
Irish 10.7 7.6 4.6 4.6 2.5 30.0 
EU-12 32.6 21.0 7.6 3.5 1.1 65.8 
Rest of World1 -1.8 1.1 4.1 3.1 7.3 13.8 
Total 41.5 29.7 16.3 11.2 10.9 109.6 
  
 Immigration by Origin, 000s 
Irish 30.7 23.8 23.0 17.9 19.6 115.0 
EU-12 85.3 54.7 21.1 9.3 10.1 180.5 
Rest of World1 35.1 35.0 29.5 14.7 23.6 137.9 
Total 151.1 113.5 73.6 41.9 53.3 433.4 
1   All countries excluding Ireland and EU-12. 
Sources:  CSO (2011, 2012a), Population and Migration Estimates. 
 
Revisions to Emigration 
Unlike immigration, the revisions to emigration for Irish and EU-12 nationals were 
small, with a combined 1,100 fewer leaving Ireland according to Census 2011. 
However, as detailed in Table 2, emigration by all other nationalities for 2007-
2011 was underestimated by 23,800. Gross emigration data shows emigrating 
Irish nationals as a share of total emigrants rose to 53 per cent during the year to 
April 2012; this is above the average share of 40 per cent for the period since 
Census 2006. The recent trend of large annual increases to emigration by Irish 
nationals has not been replicated amongst the non-Irish nationalities. 
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TABLE 2 Emigration, Revisions and Gross Data by Origin, 2007-2011
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 2007-2011 
 Revisions to Emigration by Origin, 000s 
Irish -0.2 -0.3 0.8 1.2 1.8 3.3 
EU-12 -1.8 -1.6 0.4 -0.1 -1.3 -4.4 
Rest of World1 6.1 5.7 5.6 2.8 3.6 23.8 
Total 4.1 3.8 6.8 3.9 4.1 22.7 
  
 Emigration by Origin, 000s 
Irish 12.9 13.1 19.2 28.9 42.0 116.1 
EU-12 12.6 17.2 30.5 19.0 13.9 93.2 
Rest of World1 20.8 18.7 22.3 21.3 24.7 107.8 
Total 46.3 49.0 72.0 69.2 80.6 317.1 
1   All countries excluding Ireland and EU-12 
Source:  CSO (2011, 2012a) 
 
Overall, the underestimation of net migration for 2007-2011 was 26,700 for Irish 
nationals, 70,200 for EU-12 countries (both net inward migration) and 10,000 net 
outward migration of all other nationalities, combining to 86,900 net inward 
migration for the period. 2010 and 2011 saw net outward migration of 27,400 
and 27,300 respectively, and preliminary CSO estimates for 2012 suggest this has 
widened further to 34,400. The vast majority of net emigrants are Irish nationals, 
estimated at 25,900 in 2012. Since peaking at 247,700 in 2008, the revised 
population of EU-12 citizens living in Ireland has fallen to an estimated 229,400 
for 2012. As a share of the total population, EU-12 nationalities comprised 5.5 per 
cent in 2008, compared to 5 per cent in 2012. 
 
Revisions to the Labour Force 
The labour force data based on the QNHS have also been revised for the inter-
censal period. The definitions of indicators used in the survey were updated to 
align with those of the EU Commission, and the weighting procedure was further 
refined (CSO, 2012b). The weighting adjustment aims to rectify previous 
limitations which considerably underestimated the non-Irish national population. 
 
Table 3 details the 2011 population by age group, with the change of population 
since Census 2006 and the post-census revisions also shown. As noted by the CSO 
(2012b), those aged 20-24 have an above-average unemployment rate, which 
stood at 29 per cent for the third quarter of 2012. 
 
Although the sizes of most age cohorts have increased since 2006, falling fertility 
rates during the 1980s and higher net emigration have decreased the number of 
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young adults in Ireland during the inter-censal period. The reduced age cohorts 
were for those aged 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29, falling by 9,900, 48,900 and 12,300 
respectively. 
 
TABLE 3 Population by Age Group in 2011, Post-census Revisions and Change Since 2006 
 
 Population According to 
Census 2011 
Revisions to Population and 
Migration Estimates 2011 
Change of Population, 
Census 2006-2011 
Age 000s 
0-4 356.0 -11.0 53.7 
5-9 319.6 3.1 31.1 
10-14 301.0 1.9 26.8 
15-19 281.0 11.9 -9.9 
20-24 298.6 49.1 -48.9 
25-29 362.9 -1.0 -12.3 
30-34 393.4 5.2 45.5 
35-39 363.1 15.5 42.7 
40-44 329.3 8.9 29.5 
45-49 304.1 0.5 30.3 
50-54 273.7 0.8 27.3 
55-59 243.4 -0.4 19.5 
60-64 217.1 -1.3 37.3 
65-69 172.1 1.6 30.9 
70-74 130.1 3.1 12.6 
75-79 101.4 3.2 10.0 
80-84 69.8 2.0 5.4 
85+ 58.2 -2.4 10.4 
Total 4,574.9 90.6 341.9 
 
Source:  CSO (2006, 2011, 2012). 
 
Following Census 2011 the working-age population (those aged 15 and over) for 
the second quarter of 2011 was revised upwards by 96,400, to 3,599,100 (an 
increase of 2.8%). Overall, the population aged under 45 was revised upwards by 
89,200, and by 7,200 for those aged 45 and above. Figure 2 shows the working-
age population since the third quarter of 2006; the latter half of the year were 
revised as Census 2006 was conducted in April. The rate of decline is shown to be 
smaller than was previously estimated, remaining broadly stable at 3,600,000 
since the second quarter of 2009.  
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FIGURE 2 Working-Age Population (Aged 15 Years and Over), Q3 2006-Q3 2012
 
Sources:  CSO (2012b). 
 
Based on the revised series for working-age population, the estimates of both 
employment and unemployment have been adjusted upwards. For employment, 
the differences range from 20,300 (1 per cent) in 2007 to 39,400 (2.2 per cent) in 
2011. Due to the concentration of some of the population revisions in age groups 
at high risk of unemployment, there are higher estimates for both the 
unemployment level and rate. For the second quarter of 2012, revisions 
estimated an additional 14,500 adults that were unemployed in the country, 
while the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate increased to 14.9 per cent 
from 14.8 per cent previously published (CSO, 2012b and 2012c). The revisions 
also show that the seasonally adjusted participation rate fell below 60 per cent in 
the second and third quarters of 2012, representing a nine-year low. 
 
Conclusion 
Revisions to the annual Population and Migration Estimates for 2007-2011 have 
highlighted the extent of gross inward migration flows that took place in the 
latter stages of the expansionary years. In total, 109,600 (more than a quarter of 
all immigrants for 2007-2011) were previously absent from population estimates. 
The underestimation of emigration was far less pronounced. The labour force 
implications are higher estimates of employment, unemployment and the 
unemployment rate over the revisions horizon, and a broadly stable working-age 
population over the past three years. The revisions were largely concentrated in 
age groups characterised by high unemployment and emigration levels. Given the 
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broadly static labour market prospects alluded to in this Commentary, high flows 
of net outward migration are likely to persist for several years to come. 
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*mccrorc@tcd.ie; richard.layte@esri.ie ESRI Research Bulletin 2012/4/1 
Maternal Smoking During Pregnancy and 
Child Well-Being: A Burning Issue 
*Cathal McCrory and Richard Layte1 
 
It is well established that smoking can damage your health. Nonetheless, around 
one third of the Irish population continue to smoke. Irish research (Brugha et al., 
2009) suggests that most smokers want to give up and half will have tried in the 
last year but nicotine is a notoriously addictive substance. One measure of its 
addictiveness can be gleaned from the fact that around 18 per cent of pregnant 
women smoke at some point during their pregnancy and 13 per cent continue to 
smoke right through. A positive message to emerge from recent research is that 
the rate of smoking in pregnancy in Ireland has fallen over time. Data from the 
Growing Up in Ireland study show that whilst 28 per cent of mothers whose 
children were born between 1997 and 1998 reported that they smoked during 
pregnancy, this had fallen to 18 per cent of mothers whose children were born in 
2007. This is a decrease of over 35 per cent in the proportion of women smoking 
during pregnancy. Evidence from the Slán Survey (Brugha et al., 2009) suggests 
that smoking rates among women under 45 have declined by less than 5 per cent 
over the same period, suggesting an increasing sensitivity to the dangers of 
smoking during pregnancy.     
 
Cigarettes contain a harmful cocktail of compounds including nicotine, sulphides, 
cyanide, cadmium and a host of carcinogenic hydrocarbons that are known to be 
toxic to foetal development. Smoking in pregnancy is the most important 
determinant of low birth weight in developed countries but there is now 
increasing evidence that it is also associated with longer term physical and 
neurobehavioral development. A number of international studies have suggested 
that smoking in pregnancy is associated with an increased risk of childhood 
behavioral problems, particularly externalizing disorders such as conduct 
problems and attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder. Evidence had already 
shown that exposure to nicotine led to heightened tremors and startles and to 
more irritability in early infancy and results from the Millennium Cohort Study in 
the UK (Hutchinson et al., 2010) and the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study in the 
US (Boutwell & Beaver 2010) have also found that foetal exposure to cigarette 
smoke is associated with a significantly higher risk of behavioral problems in later 
childhood. 
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An obvious challenge for research in this area is that smoking during pregnancy is 
also strongly associated with social disadvantage and deprivation, which are 
themselves independently associated with behavioral problems among children. 
It is not ethical to expose children to cigarette smoke in pregnancy to test this 
relationship as part of a scientific experiment so the UK and US research studies 
mentioned above followed a sample of children over time to observe whether 
externalizing problems are more likely to emerge after exposure to cigarette 
smoke whilst statistically adjusting for measures of social disadvantage.  
 
The Growing Up in Ireland study provides an excellent opportunity to look at this 
relationship for Ireland as it has information on maternal smoking in pregnancy as 
well as a wide range of other measures. These allow us to examine whether 
smoking conveys an increased risk for behavioral problems when we take 
account of these social factors. Importantly, the study collected information on 
the mother’s level of smoking in pregnancy and this provides us with an 
important additional tool with which to corroborate the causal relationship 
between exposure to cigarette smoke in the womb and behavioral problems at 
age 9. If the strength of the relationship between smoking and behavioral 
problems increases with the level of maternal smoking, this is more persuasive 
than a simple association. 
 
In a paper recently published in the Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, Cathal 
McCrory and Richard Layte (McCrory & Layte 2012) did just this. They showed 
that the risk of the child being reported by his/her teacher as having conduct, 
attention or hyperactivity problems at age 9 was significantly related to whether 
the mother smoked during pregnancy and, moreover, that the risk increased with 
the number of cigarettes smoked during pregnancy. The relationship is shown 
graphically in Figure 1. 
 
This evidence adds further weight to existing findings from both cohort studies of 
children and from clinical studies of the impact of cigarette smoke on brain 
development in the womb (Shea & Steiner 2008) and its relationship to child 
behavioral problems. Smoking is already an important contributor to social 
inequalities in health and mortality, but this research suggests that it may also 
damage the life chances of children whose mothers smoked during pregnancy. 
Research by the same authors (Layte & McCrory 2012) has shown that behavioral 
problems reduce educational development, which may compromise life-time 
opportunities open to those children.  
 
The drop in smoking during pregnancy observed over the last decade or so is a 
positive development for public health policy and reflects growing awareness 
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among women that smoking is hugely damaging both for the mother and her 
baby. However, the fall in smoking is not evenly spread and is increasingly heavily 
concentrated among mothers from more disadvantaged backgrounds. Research 
shows that these mothers tend to smoke more heavily on average and are more 
likely to live with other smokers, with the consequence that they find it far harder 
to quit. Research from the UK also suggests that a complex interplay of factors, 
including social disadvantage, dysfunctional relationships, and poor maternal 
mental health is implicated in maternal smoking during pregnancy (Graham et al. 
2006; Wakefield et al. 1993). These factors need to be recognized when designing 
interventions to help women reduce smoking during pregnancy, perhaps by 
involving partners and family members in the process of quitting and increasing 
awareness of the potentially damaging effects of smoking on the psychological 
health and life chances of children. 
 
FIGURE 1  Difference in the Percentage of 9-year-olds Scoring Above the 90th Percentile on the Externalising 
Dimension (Conduct problems and Attention problems) of the SDQ by Level of Maternal Smoking 
during Pregnancy (Teacher-Report) 
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The Macro-Economic Effects of Raising 
Revenue through Different Taxes 
 
John FitzGerald* 
 
All taxes have negative effects on the economy, but some taxes have particularly 
harmful effects on employment and GNP. A recently published article1 considers 
the impact on the economy of raising revenue through three different tax 
instruments: a carbon tax, a lump sum tax (similar to a flat property tax) and 
taxes on income.2 In the article each of the three taxes were increased by a 
similar amount, so as to reduce government borrowing, ex ante, by around 0.5 
per cent of GDP. This means that the macro-economic effects of each tax change 
can be directly compared. The article then analysed the medium-term macro-
economic effects of these three different tax changes using the ESRI’s HERMES 
model of the Irish economy. In each case the results of the tax increase is 
compared to a “no policy change” scenario. 
 
The key factor affecting differences in the macro-economic effects of the taxes 
was how they affected the labour market. With a very elastic supply of labour – a 
distinctive aspect of the Irish labour market – a tax on income tends to be passed 
on as higher wages in the medium term as labour supply is reduced. For example, 
spouses of many current employees face high marginal tax rates, which may 
discourage some of them from working; young workers may be attracted to other 
labour markets with lower taxes.  
 
Because the manufacturing sector is a price taker on the world market, an 
increase in labour costs adversely affects its international competitiveness and it 
is likely to result in a significant reduction in employment. At times of high 
unemployment, such as today, the pass through of taxes to higher wages may be 
attenuated, but in the medium term employees, many of whom are mobile, will 
continue to bargain in terms of real after tax wages. The results in the article 
suggest that, in the medium term, the rise in taxes on income would reduce GNP 
by nearly 0.4 per cent and employment by 0.6 per cent (Table 1). 
 
In the case of a lump sum tax (flat property tax) there is no direct change in work 
incentives. For example, the benefits of paid employment for spouses are 
unaffected by the tax. All of the initial impact of the tax is on personal income so 
that there are negative effects on consumption. However, as shown in the Table, 
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the effects on employment are more moderate than for a tax on income (-0.1 per 
cent) and, hence, the negative impact on GNP is also lower at -0.2 per cent.  
 
In the case of a carbon tax the bulk of the incidence falls on capital, not labour 
and it has much more limited negative effects on employment than a tax on 
income. While there is some loss of output, it is more concentrated in energy 
intensive than in employment intensive sectors. As well as having less negative 
effects on GNP and employment than taxes on income, a carbon tax would result 
in a significant reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases (Table 1). A carbon tax 
has a more limited impact on consumption than a lump sum tax and, as a result, 
it has a less damaging effect on economic activity. Whatever the full economic 
impact of a carbon tax in the long run, it is still the cheapest way to reduce 
emissions. Other policy instruments may achieve similar or larger emission 
reductions, but necessarily at a higher cost. 
 
The analysis in the article is valid for changes in taxation of the kind undertaken 
during the current episode of fiscal adjustment. However, if the increase in the 
carbon tax were very large, the negative competitiveness effects could be 
magnified. This is particularly the case if the price of carbon in Ireland were to be 
significantly different from that in neighbouring countries.  
 
This article found that a key channel through which tax changes affect the 
economy is through changes in the international competitiveness of 
manufacturing and services. In the article it was suggested that if a carbon tax 
was increased and the revenue used to reduce taxes on income there would be a 
real “double dividend” for Ireland – higher growth (and employment) and lower 
greenhouse gas emissions. While there is, today, no scope for reducing any taxes, 
these results do suggest how the tax system of the future could be made more 
employment friendly. 
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TABLE 1  Medium-Term Effects of Tax Changes, Percentage Change from Baseline 
 
 Carbon Tax Income Tax Lump Sum 
GDP, volume -0.21 -0.60 -0.27 
GNP, volume 0.07 -0.37 -0.20 
Output    
 Market services, volume -0.24 -0.76 -0.35 
 Manufacturing, gross volume -0.34 -0.61 0.03 
Employment -0.07 -0.59 -0.10 
Wage rate, non-agriculture 0.20 1.06 -0.06 
Consumption, constant prices -0.26 -0.88 -0.93 
Balance of payments, % of GNP 0.35 -0.33 0.41 
CO2 excl. electricity & aviation -2.02 -0.50 -0.35 
Tax incidence, %    
 Capital, domestic 39 23 20 
 Capital, foreign 38 14 1 
 Labour 12 46 5 
 Other personal income 12 16 74 
 
 
 
 
1 Conefrey, T., J. FitzGerald, L. Malaguzzi Valeri, R. S J. Tol, 2012. “The Impact of a Carbon 
Tax on Economic Growth and Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Ireland”, Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management, pp 1-19. 
DOI:10.1080/09640568.2012.709467. 
2 Similar details of the macro-economic effects for other public finance public finance 
measures are given in: Bergin, A., T. Conefrey, J. FitzGerald and I. Kearney, 2010, 
“The Behaviour of the Irish Economy: Insights from the HERMES Macro-Economic 
Model”, ESRI Working Paper 287, Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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Telecommunications Consumers: A 
Behavioural Economic Analysis1 
 
Pete Lunn∗ 
 
The digital revolution offers opportunities for communication and entertainment 
that previous generations would doubtless have envied. Yet telecommunications 
markets, especially those for broadband internet and mobile, have become the 
subject of rising customer complaints in recent times. Offerings have become 
increasingly innovative, complex and difficult to compare. The majority of 
consumers remain reluctant to shop around and a large proportion fail to choose 
the best deals. Behavioural economics offers insights into how modern telecoms 
consumers make these decisions, and what might be done to help them.  
 
Telecoms markets have four properties that, in combination, are unique. First, 
broadband internet and mobile products are effectively four products bundled 
into one: hardware, software, network and tariff structure. Consequently, 
judgements of overall product quality are highly complex. Second, the ultimate 
value to the consumer depends on the experiences the product offers access to, 
such as social interaction, instant information and online entertainment, rather 
than what the company itself provides. Third, the rapid development of new 
digital technology means that each time the consumer returns to the market, it 
has changed. Fourth, unlike any other product, mobile devices mean that 
consumers make purchase decisions numerous times throughout the day. In 
effect, telecoms consumers now sign up for always-on consumption of a variety 
of immediate experiences at zero-interest credit.  
 
The upshot of these four properties of the modern telecommunications market is 
that consumers find it difficult to assess the benefits of different offerings 
accurately. Such assessment requires consumers to judge complex products, to 
choose between services and devices with features that are new to them, to 
predict their own future usage and, then, to stick to that usage. Thus, the 
decision-making environment faced by modern telecoms consumers is very 
challenging. 
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This analysis may help to explain the low rates of switching found in the market. 
Reluctance to switch providers in search of better value is often put down to 
some kind of “irrational” loyalty to the present provider, or merely to hassle or 
inertia. Yet an alternative possibility is that many consumers do not feel 
competent to decide on which package, from among the very many alternatives, 
offers best value. Behavioural economic research shows that when decision-
makers do not feel competent in any domain they become particularly risk-
averse, reacting to the possibility of making a costly mistake. If so, then the 
standard advice to consumers to shop around in search of value may not be 
appropriate, or could even backfire by making mistakes more likely.  
 
Indeed, international evidence suggests that a large proportion of telecoms 
consumers, even in choices between just three or four offerings, choose the 
wrong option for their usage pattern. The value lost can be large: estimates 
suggest that providers make around twice as much profit from those consumers 
who pick the wrong tariff.  
 
Behavioural research offers insights into why many consumers fail to choose 
tariffs that match their usage. The likely culprits are lack of self-control and 
overconfidence. Most of us find it hard to resist immediate temptations for which 
we pay a price at a later stage. Regarding internet and mobile use, self-control 
problems are likely to be compounded by services and content that may be partly 
addictive, such as gambling opportunities, gaming, social networking, shopping or 
pornography. Behavioural research also shows that people are overconfident in 
how accurately they can predict future outcomes, underestimating the likelihood 
of extreme outcomes. Aware of the dangers of building up large bills, some 
consumers seek pre-commitment strategies to constrain or insure against their 
own future behaviour, e.g. pre-pay, flat-rates, usage limits, etc.  
 
These behavioural phenomena help to explain the popularity of “three-part 
tariffs”, where consumers pay a standing charge, a flat rate for a bundle of usage 
allowances, then penalty rates if they exceed an allowance. These tariffs are 
attractive both to consumers who are trying to constrain their usage and to those 
who are confident in their ability to predict and control it. In the event, however, 
a high proportion of consumers of broadband and mobile phone services choose 
the wrong three-part tariff, either suffering penalty rates or, more commonly, 
paying for ongoing levels of service that they do not use. The losses to consumers 
appear to be substantial. 
 
What might be done to protect telecoms consumers and to help them to make 
better decisions? One possibility is simply to place regulatory limits on penalty 
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rates for exceeding allowances. A less interventionist approach is to mandate 
certain forms of feedback to consumers. Providers could be required to make 
certain disclosures when consumers choose between tariffs, such as the 
percentage of consumers who exceed the allowances each month. Since they 
already trade on a sophisticated range of interactive services, providers could be 
mandated to give one-click access to easily interpretable data on remaining 
minutes, texts and megabytes, just as consumers can observe remaining power in 
a mobile phone battery. Or warning texts to consumers could be required at the 
point they are about to exceed allowances.  
 
Digital communications technology is providing us with ever more entertainment 
and helping us to achieve routine tasks more easily. It can also help us to make 
better decisions about which communications services to use and how much to 
pay for them. 
 
 
1 This article presents a summary of: Lunn, P.D., 2012. “Telecommunications Consumers: A Behavioural 
Economic Analysis”, Journal of Consumer Affairs, published online, 30 November, 2012. The research 
forms part of the ESRI’s Programme of Research in Communications, which is supported by the 
Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources and the Commission for 
Communications Regulation (ComReg).   
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The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment to 
China on Foreign Direct Investment to Other 
Countries 
 
Laura Resmini and Iulia Siedschlag* 
 
China has recently become a leading destination for foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The surge of FDI to China has followed its opening to the world economy 
and selective easing of capital controls. While the main motivation driving the 
increased inflows of foreign investment to China has been the availability of a 
large pool of low-cost labour, in recent years there has been a shift of inward FDI 
in China towards high-tech industries and services.  
 
The success of China in attracting FDI has raised concerns that it may have come 
about at the expense of FDI to other countries and regions.  
 
In a recently published paper1, we provide empirical evidence to answer these 
concerns. This paper addressed the following key research questions:  To what 
extent and how have FDI inflows to China affected FDI inflows to other countries, 
particularly the EU countries? Have these effects changed over time? Do these 
effects differ for market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI?  Do these effects 
differ across existing host countries?  
 
Using a theory-based gravity model and data over the period 1990-2004, the 
analysis indicates that, on average, over the analysed period, other things equal, 
FDI inflows to China have been complementary to FDI flows to other countries. 
However, this FDI creation effect has varied across country groups, being less 
strong in European countries than in the other host countries. Within the 
European Union, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries have benefited less 
from this complementary effect. This result suggests that the geographic 
proximity of the CEE countries to the sources of FDI in Western Europe has not 
been sufficient to offset the attractiveness of China as a FDI destination. In 
addition, this research found that this complementary effect of FDI to China to 
FDI to other countries has decreased over time.  
 
Furthermore, this research uncovered that increased FDI to China has 
encouraged both market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI to other countries. 
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Again, these effects have varied across country groups. It appears that in the case 
of more advanced EU economies, in comparison with non-EU countries, the FDI 
creation effect has been less strong in the case of market-seeking FDI and 
stronger in the case of efficiency-seeking FDI.   
 
A more in-depth analysis of country specific effects found that, on average, the 
FDI creation effect prevailed. However, there were a number of cases in which 
FDI to China diverted FDI from other host countries. For example, while, over the 
analysed period, FDI to China has complemented FDI to Italy, Spain and Sweden, 
it has substituted bilateral FDI flows between Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and between Greece and Portugal. 
Furthermore, it appears that FDI to China has substituted bilateral FDI flows 
between the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), and between Poland, 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic.  
 
In the case of Ireland, this analysis showed that, on average, over the analysed 
period, the FDI to China has fostered FDI to Ireland. It appears that the FDI to 
China has led to less FDI to Ireland from Belgium and France. However, this 
substitution effect has been weak.    
 
This empirical evidence suggests that while the FDI to China has fostered FDI to 
other countries located all over the world, FDI to China has substituted FDI 
among similar countries located in the same geographic area.   
 
Taken together, this research suggests that future effects of FDI to China on FDI 
to other countries are likely to foster as well as substitute FDI to other countries. 
To the extent that China’s high growth rates will persist, China is likely to attract 
more market-seeking FDI and less efficiency-seeking FDI. While the effects of FDI 
to China on FDI to other countries are likely to persist over time, country specific 
effects will change depending on the evolution of international production 
networks.  
 
1 Laura Resmini and Iulia Siedschlag, “Is Foreign Direct Investment to China Crowding Out Foreign Direct 
Investment to Other Countries?”, China Economic Review, Published online on 20 December 2012, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2012.12.003. 
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